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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Environmental and Energy Economics
by
Xueying Lu
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Mark Jacobsen, Chair
Chapter 1 investigates the distributional impacts of a unique car purchase lottery in Beijing
on the housing market. I use a difference-in-differences approach to compare heterogeneous
neighborhoods before and after implementation of the policy. At an aggregate scale, housing
prices within Beijng’s fourth ring road increase by 1 to 2% while those outside the fifth ring road
decrease by 5%. This is equivalent to transferring about 115,000 RMB ($17,000) from each
apartment owner outside the fifth ring to those within the fourth ring. The disaggregate effects
are even more pronounced: housing prices increase at locations close to common destinations
(employment centers: 5%; primary schools: 3%) and alternative transportation (subway: 3%;
buses: 4%). These changes reflect capitalization of the automobile policy and imply a large, and
xiii
likely unexpected, redistribution across homeowners. The results are relevant to policy, both in
the context of unintended consequences and for efforts to develop offsetting measures.
Chapter 2 uses the roll-out of a large transmission expansion in Texas’ electricity market
to measure the market and non-market impacts of the transmission expansion on benefits of
increased renewable capacity. We find large market benefits leading to a payback period of
roughly 14 years. However, total welfare improvements from reduced congestion depend on
how global non-market externalities are internalized by regional policy makers: accounting for
non-market externalities reduces the payback period of this project from 14 to less than 9 years.
We discuss the finding’s implications for the welfare of regional decisions to build transmission
capacity for the U.S. wholesale electricity market in response to federal renewable subsidies.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of extreme temperature on risk by leveraging daily
temperature variation with sales of a ”risky” good—Powerball tickets. Temperature and shopping
trips are connected through avoidance behavior, leading me to jointly consider trips to retail stores
in the analysis. The results show that sales of the risky good per trip increase substantially with
temperature, demonstrating a novel dimension in the connection between temperature extremes
and human behavior.
xiv
Chapter 1
Housing Markets and Automobile Policy
1.1 Introduction
Motor vehicles contribute significantly to local air pollution and traffic congestion in large
cities around the world. The 5.7 million vehicles on Beijing’s roads accounted for 31 percent
of the city’s PM2.5 in 2017 and are estimated to be responsible for more than 80 percent of
carbon monoxide emissions.1 To alleviate air pollution and traffic congestion, cities around the
world have started implementing automobile policies to restrict car use or car ownership. These
policies include car-free zones, driving restrictions and car purchase restrictions.2 Although
these policies target air pollution and traffic congestion, they could lead to indirect and likely
unintended impacts on other aspects of the economy. Specifically, automobile policies lead to
distributional impacts in a particularly important connected market: housing.
This paper investigates the distributional impacts of one such automobile policy—a car
purchase lottery in Beijing—on the housing market. The monocentric city model proposed by
1https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-pollution-autos/beijing-bans-high-emission-vehicles-in-anti-smog-
move-xinhua-idUSKBN15T00V.
2Cities that have implemented such policies include Paris (France), Berlin (Germany), Milan (Italy), Mexico
City (Mexico), Bogota (Colombia), Tokyo (Japan), Seoul (South Korea), and most major cities in China. Cities that
are currently planning to implement such policies include Madrid (Spain), Oslo (Norway), Hamburg (Germany),
London (England), Athens (Greece), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), and Helsinki (Finland).
1
Alonso (1964) and Muth (1969) suggests that housing values decline with distance from a central
business district (CBD) in order to compensate for time-inclusive commuting costs. Since policies
restricting car use or car ownership potentially increase commuting costs, the model predicts
that people will be willing to pay even more to live close to the CBD as a result. This change
in willingness to pay will be capitalized into housing prices.3 The heterogeneous capitalization
of the automobile policy across locations potentially creates substantial redistribution among
homeowners.
This paper makes two key contributions. First, it is the first paper that comprehensively
investigates the distributional impacts of an automobile policy in the housing market. This is an
important component of the welfare analysis and I show there are large, and likely unintended,
consequences of the policy. Second, this paper provides strong causal evidence on capitalization
of commuting costs by taking advantage of an exogenous shock via implementation of the car
purchase lottery. This solves potential endogeneity problems in the existing literature and I show
that the patterns and magnitudes of capitalization are consistent with theory.
The Beijing car purchase lottery was announced without warning at the end of December
2010 and entered force from January 2011. The implementation of the policy serves as an
unexpected and exogenous shock to commuting costs. The monocentric city model provides
a testable hypothesis: housing prices increase more for locations close to the CBD after the
implementation of the policy. I test the hypothesis by comparing neighborhoods located within
Beijing’s numerous “ring roads”; this provides a natural division approximately representing
different distances to the city center.4 I then loosen the assumptions of a single employment
center and single transportation mode in order to test variants of the model.5 In order to test the
3In theory capitalization can work either directly within the housing sales market or indirectly via a rental market.
In this paper, I focus only on equilibrium prices.
4Beijing’s six ring roads concentrically encircle the city, dividing it into regions.
5For the former, there might be more than one concentration of employment and people may also regularly
commute to other destinations (e.g. McDonald and McMillen 1990; Anas, Arnott, and Small, 1998). For the latter,
there can be more than one transportation mode, so that people could turn to alternative transportation when cars are
limited (e.g. LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983). Other extensions and modifications are also possible: For example, Solow
(1972) extends the model to allow for congestion, so that commuting cost depends not only on distance from the
2
modified models, I compare neighborhoods with different access to common destinations and
alternative transportation. I consider two common destinations: employment centers and primary
schools, and two alternative transportation modes: subways and buses.6
The main data I employ are monthly neighborhood-level unit housing prices from the
China Real Estate Industry Association (CREIA) from September 2009 to September 2014.7
Additionally, I construct a novel dataset of public transit and amenity access for each neighborhood
in Beijing by analyzing raw data from Baidu/Google Maps. The final dataset contains about one
thousand neighborhoods with a set of measurements including each neighborhood’s access to
employment centers, primary schools, subways, and buses. Further, I use map data to estimate
commute times to the city center and the nearest employment center by car and by pubic transit.
My empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach that compares heterogeneous
neighborhoods before and after the implementation of the lottery. I find that housing prices within
the 4th ring road increase by 1 to 2%, while those outside the 5th ring road decrease by about
5%. This is equivalent to transferring about 115,000 RMB ($17,000) from homeowners outside
the fifth ring to those within the 4th ring for a typical apartment of 100 square meters. This
is approximately 3.5 years of average disposable income per capita in Beijing. The results
reflect capitalization of commuting costs and the automobile policy, and imply a large and likely
unexpected redistribution across homeowners.
Consistent with modified versions of the monocentric city model, housing prices also
increase at locations close to common destinations and close to alternative transportation. Housing
prices for neighborhoods close to employment centers and primary schools increase by 5% and 3%
respectively, with implicit transfers of 79,000 RMB ($11,850) and 45,500 RMB ($6,825) across
homeowners.8 Housing prices also increase for neighborhoods with better access to public transit:
CBD but also on the density of traffic. Due to data constraints I focus on a series of simpler variants.
6People tend to regularly commute to employment centers for work and take their kids to primary schools, so the
policy would potentially increase their willingness to pay for these locations. Substitution between private cars and
public transit makes people more willing to pay for locations close to public transit after the policy.
7The unit housing price is expressed in Chinese RMB/m2. About 6.8 RMB is equivalent to 1 USD.
8In my difference-in-differences analysis, I use the median of the distances to divide control and treatment groups
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there is a 3.3% increase in housing prices close to subways and a 4.2% decrease in housing prices
when there are few buses, equivalent to implicit transfers of 48,800 RMB ($7,320) and 54,100
RMB ($8,115) respectively. The results indicate not only the capitalization of commuting costs
and the distributional impacts across homeowners, but also the values of developing employment
centers, building primary schools, and expanding public transit to households nearby.9
To validate my results, I also estimate the value of commuting time implicit in the
capitalization. People who would buy cars were there no purchase lottery value one minute of
increased daily commuting time by about 0.3% of housing price, an average of 2,700 RMB ($400).
Under reasonable assumptions, the hourly value of time is estimated to be 32.4 RMB ($4.86),
roughly 1.2 times the average hourly wage in 2011. Taking the discomfort and inconvenience of
public transit into account this implicit value of time approximates wages, further grounding the
distributional results. This estimate also suggests that the capitalization I observe is complete, in
the sense that most or all of the change in commute cost appears directly in neighborhood-level
housing prices.
This paper builds on a long literature in urban economics seeking to understand the
relationship between commuting cost and location choice. Earlier work tends to take a hedonic
approach (e.g. Rosen, 1974; Anas and Chu, 1984; Coulson and Engle, 1987), or utilize highway,
rail station and subway expansions (e.g. Bajic, 1983; Nelson, 1992; Gatzla and Smith, 1993;
Cervero et al., 2004; McMillen and McDonald, 2004; Ryan, 2005; Debrezion et al., 2007;
Baum-Snow, 2007) and fuel prices (e.g. Sexton et al., 2012; Molloy and Shan, 2013) as sources
of variation in commuting cost. Important challenges in this line of work include omitted
variables and endogeneity to do with anticipation and simultaneity in general equilibrium.10 My
in most cases, mainly to keep the number of observations balanced. In alternative specifications, I use the distances
directly to indicate treatment with intensity.
9My results on the price premium associated with subways is consistent with and complementary to Xu et al.
(2015).
10Omitted variables are a key challenge for hedonic methods. The concern with public transit expansion is that
anticipation of the expansion and changes during construction can contaminate the treatment and bias the results.
The difficulty in using gasoline prices is that gasoline prices and housing prices are simultaneously determined in
general equilibrium. For example, both will vary with the business cycle. Moreover, the decision of buying houses
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study instead leverages the unanticipated loss of cars as a commuting option: this allows me to
directly measure changes in housing value without relying on potentially endogenous changes
to infrastructure. My paper also adds to this important literature by exploring capitalization of
commuting cost in a developing country; most existing studies focus on developed regions.
My study also builds on a series of papers evaluating various consequences of automobile
polices. Empirical studies have focused on impacts of automobile policies on the environment
(e.g. Davis, 2008; Lin et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Viard and Fu, 2011; Lu, 2016), congestion,
and the car market (Li, 2014; Yang et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2017). However, there is very little
empirical evidence on indirect impacts of these policies in connected markets.11 This paper
adds to the literature by providing the first comprehensive evidence of the indirect impacts of an
automobile policy on an important connected market: housing.
Finally, my paper is also closely related to Xu et al. (2015), which focuses on the subway
capitalization of day-of-week driving restrictions in Beijing.12 My paper differs from theirs in
the following three aspects. First, I use a difference-in-differences approach in a fixed effects
model, solving potential problems that appear with their hedonic approach.13 Second, I build
on their results to consider not only subways, but also the bus network, ring road areas, and
common destinations such as employment centers and primary schools. Third, I identify new
distributional effects that come through connected markets and via a different mechanism within
the population.14
depends not only on current gasoline prices but also on anticipated future price.
11Air pollution has been proven to affect many aspects of human being’s physical and mental health (e.g. Chay
and Greenstone, 2003; Currie and Walker, 2011; Schlenker and Walker, 2015, etc.), human resources and labor
markets (e.g. Currie et al., 2009; Zweig et al., 2009; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012; Chang et al., 2016; Isen et al.,
2014; Lavy et al., 2014; Prashant et al., 2014; Hanna and Oliva, 2015, etc.). These are all potential indirect impacts
of automobile policies through the impacts on air pollution. But little empirical work has directly explored these
indirect impacts, especially impacts on the housing market.
12During the Olympic and Paralympic Games, cars with license plate numbers ending with odd and even digits
could not drive on the road on alternate days. Currently, cars must be taken off the road one day per week according
to the last number of their license plates.
13Unobserved variables make it difficult to compare housing prices at locations with different access to subways
before the driving restriction.
14The affected population groups in the lottery policy are different: the driving restriction affects people who
already have cars and it only affects driving for certain day(s) of a week in certain areas, while the car purchase
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The findings in this paper confirm the predictions of urban economics models and show
that commuting cost matters when people make decisions about their locations. Perhaps more
interestingly, automobile policy has led to large distributional impacts on housing values. This is
an important component of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis and suggests that policymakers
may want to consider a range of compensatory policy. Beyond the redistribution among home-
owners at different locations, there is also potential redistribution among people with and without
(pre-existing) cars. Finally, given that the rich are more likely to pre-sort themselves into locations
that have high values and are also more likely to own cars, both channels of redistribution tend to
increase inequality. These questions are beyond the scope of the current paper but are avenues for
future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the policy. Section 3
shows a simple conceptual model. Section 4 describes the datasets used in this paper. Section
5 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 presents a set of
robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Car Purchase Lottery in Beijing
As an effort to mitigate air pollution and traffic congestion, Beijing unexpectedly an-
nounced a car purchase lottery in allocating permits to buy cars at the end of December 2010.
The lottery takes place every month to render about 20,000 permits to individuals and institutions
that intend to purchase cars starting from January 2011. A permit is required for first-time vehicle
owners in Beijing, including buying a new car, purchasing an old car, accepting a gifted car,
or transferring out-of-state registration to Beijing. Vehicle owners who scrap the used vehicles
can transfer the old licenses to the new vehicles and do not need the permits. Permits cannot be
transferred and expire in 6 months if not used. Expired permits are put back to the pool again and
lottery directly cuts demand in the car market and it broadly affects those who do not own cars. The former affects
the intensive margin of the car use, while the latter affects the extensive margin of car use.
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increase the number of winners in the month when the old permits expire.
The policy has turned out to be very restrictive in terms of reducing new car purchases
and slowing down the growth rate of car ownership. Figure 1.1 shows the number of applicants
and the rate of winning for the lottery in Beijing. The number of winners was relatively stable
(20,000 per month as stated above).15 Compared to the limited permits granted, the number of
applicants was much larger in scale and the rate of winning dramatically dropped during the first
half year and continued to decrease. The winning rate reached about 0.1% at the end of 2013.16
As a result of the low winning rates, the car sales dropped in significance. Figure 1.2 and Figure
1.3 show that the car sales before the lottery presented a quadratic trend, but there was a huge
drop right after the policy. The drop in car sales also led to a smaller growth rate in car ownership,
which confirms that the policy has been very restrictive.
Figure 1.1: Car Purchase Lottery in Beijing
15Only when there were permits unused and expired, they would be put back to the pool and the number of winners
changed slightly.
16Note that although the number reflects the difficulty of getting the permits in Beijing, it does not indicate the
actual demand in any particular month. Getting to know the difficulty, people may join the lottery anyway just in
case they need a car in the near future.
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Figure 1.2: Car sales in Beijing
In addition to Beijing, there are several other cities that have implemented similar restric-
tions. For example, Shanghai started to implement a car purchase restriction to control for car
ownership through an auction system in 1994. Auctions are held monthly to distribute about
10,000 permits. Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hangzhou and Shenzhen introduced a mixture of auction
and lottery with part of the permits issued by lottery and the rest issued by auction. People can
choose to participate in one of them. Table 1.1 briefly summarizes the car purchase restrictions
in different cities in China. Besides, some other cities have also planned to implement similar
policies in the near future. Although the policies differ in terms of implementing methods, they
could potentially have similar distributional impacts on the housing market, which makes my
results applying to a broader scenario.
There are two main reasons why I focus on the policy in Beijing: First, Beijing was the
first to implement the policy a long time after Shanghai so that the policy was unexpectedly
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Figure 1.3: Car Ownership in Beijing
Table 1.1: Car Purchase Restrictions in China
City Starting Time Method Anual Permits
Shanghai 1994 Auction 120,000
Beijing December 2010 Lottery 240,000
Guiyang July 2011 Lottery or Restricted License
Guangzhou July 2012 Auction or Lottery 120,000
Shijiazhuang January 2013 Household Third Car
Tianjin December 2013 Auction or Lottery 100,000
Hangzhou March 2013 Auction or Lottery 80,000
Shenzhen December 2014 Auction or Lottery 100,000
announced and enforced.17 People have almost no time to react before the implementation of
the policy. However, after Beijing’s policy, there were predictions by newspapers and rumors
about which cities would follow Beijing’s policy. People then started to have anticipation about
implementation of similar policies in their own cities. Anticipation would contaminate the
treatment and bias the results. Second, Beijing has a typical centered city structure which is also
geographically homogeneous and has good access to public transit, providing a good environment
to test for the urban economics models described above.
17The housing prices data is not available around the time of Shanghai’s policy.
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1.3 A Simple Conceptual Model
In this section, I use a simple conceptual model based on the monocentric city model to
show how an increase in commuting costs would have a differential effect on housing prices at
different locations. For simplicity, I make the following assumptions. First, I assume citizens
are identical with the same preference and income level, and they all commute to the city center.
Second, I assume the city is closed in the sense that people can only move within the city but
cannot move to other cities.18 Third, people choose where to live, but they can only buy one unit
of house at the location they choose. Fourth, commuting cost is linear in the distance from the
city center. Finally, housing supply is fixed at each location. Some of these assumptions can be
relaxed. First, I can allow people choosing different amounts of housing (e.g. different sizes,
multiple houses, etc.). Second, I can allow people choosing different modes of transportation (e.g.
cars, public transit, walking, etc.) and fit lotteries and auctions in this setting. Finally, I can allow
housing supply changing through a housing production market.19
In this simple conceptual model, an individual maximizes his/her utility subject to the
budget constraint, that is,
max
Z,d
U(Z) s.t. Y = Z+P(d)+ td (1.1)
where Z is the composite good (i.e. goods other than houses and commuting) they consumes, d is
the distance of the location from the city center, P(d) is the housing price at location d, t is the
commuting cost per unit of distance .
First order condition suggests thatU
′
(Z)(−P′(d)− t) = 0, that is, P∗′(d) =−t < 0, which
means that given commuting cost fixed, housing price decreases as distance increases, which is
the basic conclusion from the urban economics models. We can see that P∗(d) and P∗′(d) are
18This is a relatively strict assumption. But in many large cities in China, there are some restrictions for non-
citizens to buy houses. For example, non-citizens need to work in Beijing for at least five years to buy a house in
Beijing. So for the purpose of my application, this assumption makes some sense.
19I relax these assumptions and conduct a set of policy analysis in another paper.
10
functions of t and can be written as P∗(d, t) and ∂P
∗(d,t)
∂d . Then we can get that
∂2P∗(d,t)
∂d∂t =−1 < 0,
which means that the housing price decreases faster as distance increases when commuting cost
is larger. This is the differential effect I want to estimate in this paper.20 I estimate the differential
effects both by groups and continuously in my empirical study.
1.4 Data
The primary dataset used in this paper is the monthly neighborhood-level unit housing
prices from China Real Estate Industry Association for September 2009-September 2014. A total
number of one thousand neighborhoods in Beijing are included. The dataset contains the location
of each neighborhood and allows me to study the changes of relative housing prices at different
locations.
I construct a novel dataset of public transit and amenity access for each neighborhood
in Beijing by analyzing raw data from Baidu/Google Maps by GIS.21 My final dataset contains
about one thousand neighborhoods with the following measurements: 1) The ring road area
each neighborhood belongs to; 2) Distance to the nearest employment centers; 3) Distance to
the nearest primary schools; 4) Distance to the nearest subway stations; 5)The number of buses
within 500 meters;22 6) Estimated commuting time to the nearest employment centers/the city
center by public transit; 8) Estimated commuting time to the nearest employment centers/the
city center by car.23 The public transit data is scraped from Baidu/Google Maps API and the
measurements are calculated by arcGIS. Note that there were several major new subway openings
during my data period. For each new subway opening, I calculate a different set of distance to the
20Since many of the assumptions are not satisfied in reality, the size of the differential effect is not necessarily to
be one.
21Details on how to construct the dataset in arcGIS are described in the Appendix.
22I measure the access to subways and buses differently because subways are much less densely distributed than
buses. Therefore, the distance to the nearest subways and the number of buses within a radius are good measurements.
23Commuting time is in the unit of minutes. Distances calculated by arcGIS are in meters, but I translate them into
kilometers for better presentation of estimation results.
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nearest subway station and commuting time.24
Annual district-level population density and disposable income are available from Beijing
Area Statistical Year Book. I control for these covariates in my preferred specification. Figure 1.4
shows the distribution of the neighborhoods together with the main ring roads and subway lines
in Beijing. Most of the neighborhoods in my dataset are located within the sixth ring road. There
are two main employment centers: the Guomao CBD and the Zhongguancun technological center,
both of which absorb large proportions of employment in Beijing. Table 1.2 reports summary
statistics of housing prices, covariates and a set of measurements of subway and amenity access.25
The average unit housing price in Beijing during the time period is roughly 30 thousand RMB
per square meter, which is approximately the same as the average disposable income. Figure
1.5 shows the map of percentage changes in housing prices by quintiles by year in Beijing. The
red dots (with the highest percentage change) and the yellow dots (with the lowest percentage
change) are pretty randomly distributed relative to the city center before the lottery (2009-2010).
After the restriction, the red dots concentrate more in the center (2010-2011, 2011-2012). This
suggests that housing prices increase more for neighborhoods close to the city center.
24Using neighborhoods that are affected by new subway openings generate endogenous problems and new subway
openings would have some own effects. So in one of the robustness checks, I limit my observations only to unaffected
neighborhoods.
25Population is in the unit of ten thousand, income is in RMB, distances are in kilometers, and commuting time
is in minutes. The measurement of commuting time by public transit is a lower bound because I do not take into
account the waiting time, so the estimate of the effects would be an upper bound.
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Figure 1.4: Beijing Map
1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Ring Roads
To investigate the causal impacts of the car purchase lottery on housing markets, I first
consider neighborhoods located at different ring road areas to test the basic monocentric city
model. The model assumes that employment is located exclusively at the city center in a central
business district (CBD), and it predicts that housing values decline with distance from the CBD to
compensate for time-inclusive commuting costs. The car purchase lottery increased commuting
costs, so people would be willing to pay more to live close to the CBD because of the policy.
The change of their willingness to pay then can be capitalized into housing prices in the short
run. Therefore, the model provides a testable hypothesis: the housing prices increase more for
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Housing Prices (RMB/m2) 54,767 30,605 12,861 4,575 98,730
Income(RMB) 54,767 29,125 6,491 16,635 47,392
Population(10 thousand) 54,767 258.6 111.7 28 392.2
Population Density(per km2) 54,767 8,413 6,309 193 25,787
Distance to City Center 54,767 11.51 5.710 0.309 41.63
Distance to Employment Center 54,767 8.975 5.017 0.0887 31.54
Distance to Primary School 54,767 0.587 0.469 0.0190 4.038
Distance to Subway 54,767 1.757 1.924 0.0242 23.37
Distance to Bus 54,767 0.233 0.183 0 1.199
Number Bus within 200 meters 54,767 5.347 8.067 0 50
Number Bus within 500 meters 54,767 30.88 24.59 0 141
Time to City Center Car(min) 54,767 13.42 6.772 0.341 48.07
Time to Employment Center Car(min) 54,767 11.02 6.173 0.446 38.91
Time to City Center Transit(min) 54,767 21.70 11.57 1.955 110.1
Time to Employment Center Transit(min) 54,767 19.57 11.69 0.851 101.4
locations close to the CBD after the implementation of the policies. The model can be easily
extended by loosening the assumptions of single employment center and single transportation
mode. For the former, there might be more than one concentration of employment and people
may also regularly commute to other destinations (e.g. McDonald and McMillen’s, 1990; Anas,
Arnott, and Small, 1998). For the latter, there can be more than one transportation mode, so that
people could turn to alternative transportation when cars are limited (e.g. LeRoy and Sonstelie,
1983). I will also test different versions of the model in the following subsections.
The ring roads in Beijing play an important role in commuting.26 They divide the city
into several areas, each of which represents different distance to the city center. As shown in
Figure 1.4, the five ring roads categorize the neighborhoods in my dataset into about five groups:
within the second ring road, between the second and third ring roads, between the third and fourth
26Transportation related policies sometimes also take the ring roads as the boundaries to implement controls. For
example, driving restrictions mandated that vehicles with certain plate numbers cannot drive on and within the 5th
ring road. When people talk about their houses, they also refer to the relative location to the ring roads.
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ring roads, between the fourth and fifth ring roads, and outside the fifth ring road.27 Therefore, it
is a natural division to look at which is consistent with the urban economics model I would like to
test for.
My estimating equation investigates causal effects of the car purchase lottery on the
percentage change in housing prices, so I use a log form of the dependent variable—unit housing
prices. To estimate the effects, I employ a difference-in-differences approach taking neigh-
borhoods between the fourth and fifth ring roads as the control group and other groups as the
treatment groups.28 I compare them before and after the implementation of the car purchase
lottery and obtain treatment effects by interacting the treatment dummy with the group dummies.
The estimation equation is given as follows.
log(Pit) = α+∑β j ∗ (policyt ∗1{Ringi = j})+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.2)
where i denotes the neighborhood, t denotes the time (i.e. month of sample), log(Pit) is the
log form of housing prices for neighborhood i at time t, policyt is the indicator whether the car
purchase lottery has been implemented at time t, 1{Ringi = j} are the indicators whether the
neighborhood locates in ring road area j, ηci is the neighborhood fixed effect, ξt is the time
fixed effect, εcit is the error term. By adding the time fixed effects (i.e. month of sample fixed
effects) and the neighborhood fixed effects, the regression controls for all neighborhood level time
invariant factors and all common time trends. β′js are the coefficients of interest, which capture
the housing price changes for neighborhoods in group j compared to those lie between the fourth
and fifth ring roads. I expect β2, β3 and β4 to be positive and β6 to be negative for consistency
with the model.
27There is no first ring road in Beijing, or we call it the city center. There are a few neighborhoods located outside
the sixth ring road, but I group them together with those between the fifth and sixth ring roads due to the small
number of observations.
28It does not matter to use other groups as the control group, and the relative impacts should be similar. The reason
why I choose neighborhoods between the fourth and fifth ring roads as the control group is that from the pre-trends I
plot in Figure 1.6, this group presents almost no changes in the housing prices before and after the policy. Therefore,
the relative impacts can be approximately taken as absolute impacts to some extent.
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To identify the causal impacts, there are three key assumptions required. First, the policy
needs to come as a shock without any expectation. This assumption is met because the car
purchase lottery in Beijing was announced suddenly without any anticipation and implemented
almost immediately after the announcement. Second, no other shocks that could have similar
impacts coincided with the implementation of the policy. I discuss the following two policies in
the housing market and the car market that could potentially affect my study.
Small Car Sales Tax Cut: Chinese government announced a national sales tax cut for
private cars with engine size less than 1.6L from 10% to 5% in early 2009. The tax rate was
raised to 7.5% one year later in 2010, and was completely ended in 2011. The end of the tax cut
coincided with the implementation of the car purchase lottery in Beijing. The tax cut has two
possible impacts: increasing the total car sales, and substituting from large vehicles to small cars.
The end of the tax cut then would have the opposite effects. For the former, the car purchase
lottery is much stricter and dominate the termination of the tax cut. Figure 1.1 shows that the
number of applicants are much larger than the permits granted, which indicates that the end of
the tax cut is not the main binding factor that determines the final car sales. For the latter, the
main linkage between the car market and the housing market is commuting from car ownership
and usage. The impact of the type of cars on the housing market will be a second order issue.
Therefore, the tax cut will not be a big concern in my study.
Housing Purchase Restriction: Beijing government announced a housing purchase
restriction in April 2010. Households with Beijing Hukou were limited to have up to two
houses/apartments, while households without Hukou but pay insurance and taxes for 5 years
or above in Beijing were limited to have only one house/apartment.29 The goal of the housing
purchase restriction is to prevent the irrational investment in the housing market, so it does not
have direct impact on housing purchase in need. The housing values could also be affected
and reflect people’s willingness to pay through the renting market even if the housing market is
29Hukou is a system of household registration in China. A change of Hukou typically requires a job (mainly from
nation-owned institutions) that is able to provide a Hukou change.
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limited. However, it is possible that the housing purchase restriction makes the house/apartment
in need more valuable compared to those for investment purpose.30 To rule out this possibility, a
placebo test at the cutoff of the housing purchase restriction will be conducted.
Third, the control group should be a good control so that neighborhoods in the control
group would behave similarly to the treated neighborhoods had they implemented the lottery. To
test the third assumption, I check the similarity of the pre-trends of the control group and the
treatment groups by plotting the residuals of the logged housing prices after controlling for time
trends by groups in Figure 1.6.31 The control group (neighborhoods between the fourth and fifth
ring roads) presents a parallel pre-trend as the four treatment groups (neighborhoods within the
second ring road, between the second and third ring roads, between the third and fourth ring roads,
between the fourth and fifth ring roads, and outside the fifth ring road). The parallel pre-trends
suggests that the control group is a good control so the difference-indifferences approach is valid.
The trend for the control group is quite flat both before and after the car purchase lottery, while
those for the treatment groups start to diverge beginning at the implementation of the policy. For
the treatment groups within the fourth ring road, there are increases in the housing prices after the
car purchase lottery. For the treatment group outside the fifth ring road, there is a huge drop. This
suggests that housing prices within the fourth ring road increase while the housing prices outside
the fifth ring road decrease due to the policy. Homeowners within the fourth ring road benefit
while those outside the fifth ring road lose, which can be seen as an implicit transfer among
homeowners. This is the distributional impact I would like to estimate. The causal impacts with a
difference-in-differences estimation are shown in the next section.
30For example, I previously plan to buy 3 houses, one for living in the center and two for investment in the suburbs.
When the restriction came out, I would not buy one of them in the suburbs.
31Since the housing prices present significant time trends, it is cleaner to visualize the pre-trends after getting rid
of the time trends.
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1.5.2 Employment Centers and Primary Schools
To test the modified version of the monocentric city model with more than one common
destination, I investigate locations with different access to employment centers and primary
schools. People are likely to commute to the former and drive their kids to the latter on a daily
basis. These locations are defined as common destinations. The car purchase lottery could have
differential impacts on housing prices for neighborhoods close to the common destinations from
others. I compare neighborhoods close to these locations with those far away by either setting
reasonable cutoffs or applying treatment with intensity.
I employ a similar difference-in-differences approach to identify the causal impacts of
the car purchase lottery on housing prices of neighborhoods with different access to employment
centers and primary schools. I define two main employment centers: one is a traditional CBD (i.e.
Guomao) and the other is a technology center (i.e. Zhongguancun), both of which absorb a large
portion of employment in Beijing. The locations of the two employment centers are shown in
Figure 1.4 as purple and orange stars respectively. I take neighborhoods more than 8km away
from its nearest employment centers as the control group and those with less than 8km away as the
treatment group.32 For the primary schools, I take neighborhoods more than 0.5km away from its
nearest primary schools as the control group and those with less than 0.5km away as the treatment
group.33 I compare the control and treatment groups before and after the implementation of the
car purchase lottery and obtain treatment effects by interacting the treatment dummy with the
group dummies. The estimation equations are given as follows.
log(Pit) = α+βemploy ∗ (policyt ∗1{Distanceemployi < 8})+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.3)
32The cutoff is chosen as the median, mainly to keep the observations in the treatment and control groups balanced.
In some specifications, I use the distance directly as treatment with intensity. Similar for cutoffs in other estimations
below.
33Primary schools are more spread out, so the average distance is smaller. Besides, kids are not able to walk too
long to primary schools, so 0.5km seems a reasonable cutoff.
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log(Pit) = α+βschool ∗ (policyt ∗1{Distanceschooli < 0.5})+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.4)
where log(Pit) is the log form of housing prices for neighborhood i at time t, policyt is the
indicator whether the car purchase lottery has been implemented at time t, 1{Distanceemployi < 8}
is the indicator whether the neighborhood’s distance to the nearest employment centers is less than
8km, 1{Distanceschooli < 0.5} is the indicator whether the neighborhood’s distance to the nearest
primary schools is less than 0.5km, ηci is the neighborhood fixed effect, ξt is the time fixed effect,
εcit is the error term. βemploy and βschool are the coefficients of interest. The former captures
the housing price change for neighborhoods 8km away from employment centers compared to
those within 8km, and the latter captures the housing price change for neighborhoods 0.5km away
from primary schools compared to those within 0.5km. I expect both of βemploy and βschool to be
positive.
Similarly, there are three key identification assumptions: no expectation, no confounding
shocks, and parallel pre-trends. The first two assumptions have been discussed and are met. For
the third one, I plot the residuals of logged housing prices after controlling for time trends by
access to employment centers and primary schools in Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 respectively.
Figure 1.7 shows that the pre-trends for the two groups with different access to employment
centers present slight opposite trends to post-restriction ones. Therefore, by assuming them
to be parallel, the differential impact of the policy on neighborhoods with different access to
employment centers tends to be underestimated. Figure 1.8 shows parallel pre-trends for the
two groups with different access to primary schools, so the impact estimated by a difference-
indifferences approach for neighborhoods with different access to primary schools is valid. The
trends for the treatment group and the control group start to diverge after the policy for both
analysis on employment centers and primary schools. This suggests that housing prices rise
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for neighborhoods close to common destinations, which indicates not only the capitalization
of commuting costs and the distributional impacts across homeowners, but also the values of
developing employment centers and building primary schools to households nearby.
Although the estimation by groups allows us to better interpret the results and conduct
welfare calculations, estimation by treatment with intensity provides better predictions of housing
price changes for any particular neighborhood. Therefore, I also use the distance to the nearest
employment centers and primary schools directly as treatment with intensity and estimate the
following equations.
log(Pit) = α+β
employ
d ∗ (policyt ∗Distanceemployi )+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.5)
log(Pit) = α+βschoold ∗ (policyt ∗Distanceschooli )+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.6)
where Distanceemployi is the distance of neighborhood i to the nearest employment centers,
Distanceschooli is the distance of neighborhood i to the nearest primary schools, all else are same
as above. βemployd and β
school
d are the coefficients of interest, which capture the differential impacts
on housing prices of one more kilometer away from the employment centers and primary schools
respectively. I expect βemployd and β
school
d to be negative.
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1.5.3 Public Transit
To test the modified model with more than one transportation mode, I look at neigh-
borhoods with different access to subways and buses. In addition to moving close to common
destinations, people might substitute cars by public transit as another way to react to the car
purchase lottery. Therefore, I consider two measurements associated with the two public transit
modes: the distance to the nearest subway stations and the number of buses within a walking
distance.34 By employing a difference-in-differences approach, I consider the neighborhoods
which have subway access within 1.5km as the treatment group and those which are more than
1.5km away from the nearest subway stations as the control group. For bus access, I use the
number of buses within 500 meters as a measurement.35 The treatment group is defined as the
neighborhoods with less than 30 buses and the control group contains the rest of neighborhoods.
The estimation equations are as follows.
log(Pit) = α+βsubway ∗ (policyt ∗1{Distancesubwayi < 1.5})+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.7)
log(Pit) = α+βbus ∗ (policyt ∗1{No.Buswithin500mi < 30})+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.8)
where log(Pit) is the log form of housing prices for neighborhood i at time t, policyt is the indicator
whether the car purchase lottery has been implemented at time t, 1{Distancesubwayi < 1.5} is
the indicator whether the neighborhood’s distance to the nearest subway stations is less than
1.5km, 1{No.Buswithin500mi < 30} is the indicator whether there are more than 30 buses within 500
34The bus system is more mature than subways in Beijing, so the number of buses matters more than the distance
to the nearest bus stops.
35If one bus route goes both directions, it accounts as two. If there are two close bus stops within 500 meters, it
also accounts as two.
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meters of the neighborhood, ηci is the neighborhood fixed effect, ξt is the time fixed effect, εcit is
the error term. βsubway ∗ (policyt and βbus ∗ (policyt are the coefficients of interest. The former
captures the housing price change for neighborhoods 1.5km away from subway stations compared
to those within 1.5km, and the latter captures the housing price change for neighborhoods with
more than 30 buses within 0.5km compared to those without. I expect both of βsubway and βbus to
be positive.
The identification strategy requires parallel pre-trends as stated above. Figure 1.9 and
Figure 1.10 plot the residuals of logged housing prices after controlling for time trends by subway
access and bus access respectively. For both graphs, the trends before the policy are similar and
they diverge after the policy. Therefore, the difference-in-differences strategy applied is valid.
The divergence of the trends after the policy suggests that housing prices rise for neighborhoods
close to public transit, which indicates not only the capitalization of commuting costs and the
distributional impacts across homeowners, but also the values of public transit to households
nearby.
I also use the distance to the nearest subway stations and number of bus stops within 500
meters directly as treatment with intensity and estimate the following equations.
log(Pit) = α+β
subway
d ∗ (policyt ∗Distancesubwayi )+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.9)
log(Pit) = α+βbusd ∗ (policyt ∗No.Buswithin500mi )+ γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+ εit (1.10)
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whereDistancesubwayi is the distance of neighborhood i to the nearest subway stations, No.Bus
within500m
i
is the number of buses with 500 meters of neighborhood i, all else are same as above. βsubwayd and
βbusd are the coefficients of interest, which capture the differential impacts on housing prices of one
more kilometer away from subway stations and one more buses within 500 meters respectively. I
expect βsubwayd and β
bus
d to be negative.
1.5.4 Commuting Time
Although I have shown the validity of the identification assumptions above, I would also
like to check whether the scale of the results make sense and whether the policy could be fully
or partially capitalized into housing prices. The policy provides a context to estimate the value
of time because the commuting time differs by different transpiration modes. For people who
would buy cars had there were no purchase restrictions, they can drive cars in the counterfactual
world without the car purchase lottery. I assume that people who already have cars before the
policy behave similarly to those who would buy cars.36 Therefore, the policy serves as a shock to
people’s commuting time by switching from driving cars to taking public transit. I estimate the
value of increased commuting time by the following estimation equation.
log(Pit)=α+βtime∗(policyt ∗TimePubi +(1− policyt)∗TimeCari )+γ∗Xdt+ηi+ξt+εit (1.11)
where log(Pit) is the log form of housing prices for neighborhood i at time t, policyt is the indicator
whether the car purchase lottery has been implemented at time t, TimePubi is the commuting time to
the city center or the nearest employment center by public transit, TimeCari is the commuting time
to the city center or the nearest employment center by car, ηci is the neighborhood fixed effect, ξt
is the time fixed effect, εcit is the error term. The term policyt ∗TimePubi +(1− policyt)∗TimeCari
36Due to the lack of micro data, I cannot test this assumption but take it as given.
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equals the commuting time by car before the policy and equals the commuting time by public
transit after the policy. βtime is the coefficient of interest, which captures the value of one minute
of the increased commuting time. By comparing the estimated value of time with the wage rate, I
can answer the question whether the policy could be fully or partially capitalized into housing
prices.
1.6 Main Results
1.6.1 Ring Roads
Table 1.3 shows the results by estimating Equation (1.2). Month of sample fixed effects
and neighborhood fixed effects are controlled for all columns. Standard errors are clustered by
town.37 Column (1) reports the results without further controlling for district-level covariates.
Column (2) reports the results by further controlling for annual district-level disposable income
where the neighborhoods belong to. Column (3) reports the results by further controlling for
annual district-level population density. Column (4) reports the results by controlling for both
income and population density. Column (4) is my preferred specification. Across all specifications,
the results are similar and consistent.
Compared to the neighborhoods located between the fourth and fifth ring roads, housing
prices for neighborhoods within the second ring road increase by about 2%, neighborhoods
between the second and third ring roads increase about 1-2%, while housing prices outside
the fifth ring decrease by about 5%. The effect on the neighborhoods between the third and
fourth ring roads is positive but small and insignificant. This is equivalent to transferring about
115,000 RMB ($17,000) from homeowners outside the fifth ring to those within the 4th ring for
37Towns are subdivision of districts, while districts are subdivision of Beijing. The neighborhoods in my dataset
are covered by 12 districts and 144 towns. I also report the Conley spatial HAC standard errors in one of my
robustness checks. I report the standard errors clustered by town in my main specifications because it turns out to be
more conservative.
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a typical apartment with 100 square meters, approximately 3.5 years of the average disposable
income per capita in Beijing.38 The results imply a large and likely unexpected redistribution
across homeowners at different ring road areas. It also reflects capitalization of commuting costs,
consistent with the basic monocentric city model.
Table 1.3: Impacts of Car Purchase Restriction on Housing Prices By Ring Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*<2 Ring 0.0227** 0.0251** 0.0175 0.0211*
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0111)
Policy*2-3 Ring 0.0189* 0.0190* 0.0174* 0.0178*
(0.00975) (0.00969) (0.00965) (0.00956)
Policy*3-4 Ring 0.00871 0.00695 0.00857 0.00694
(0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0105)
Policy*5-6 Ring -0.0509*** -0.0481*** -0.0484*** -0.0463***
(0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0153)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.962 0.961 0.962
Within R-squared .023 .026 .024 .026
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
38The average unite prices within the second ring road, between the second and third ring roads, and outside the fifth
ring are about 42,000 RMB, 37,000 RMB, and 23,000 RMB respectively. Therefore, the average loss for homeowners
with a typical 100 square meter apartment outside the fifth ring road is calculated by 23000*0.05*100=115000. The
average gain for homeowners within the second ring road, and homeowners between the second and third ring roads
are 42000*0.02*100 = 84000, and 37000*0.01*100 = 37000. The loss is approximately equal to the sum of the gain.
The average disposable income for Beijing in 2011 is about 32,000 RMB.
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1.6.2 Employment Centers and Primary Schools
Table 1.4 and 1.5 show the results by access to employment centers and primary schools.
Month of sample fixed effects and neighborhood fixed effects are controlled for all columns.
Standard errors are clustered by town. Column (1) and (3) report the results without further
controlling for district-level covariates. Column (2) and (4) report the results by further controlling
for annual district-level disposable income and population density where the neighborhoods
belong to. Column (1) and (2) report the results by group by estimating Equation (1.3) and
Equation (1.4). Column (3) and (4) reports the results by treatment with intensity by estimating
Equation (1.5) and Equation (1.6). Across all specifications, the results are similar and consistent.
Housing prices for neighborhoods whose distance to the nearest employment centers are
less than 8km (which is th treatment group) increase by about 5% compared to the neighborhoods
located more than 8km away from the nearest employment centers (which is the control group).
This is equivalent to transferring about 79,000 RMB ($11,850) from homeowners close to
employment centers to those far away from employment centers, approximately 2.5 years of the
average disposable income per capita in Beijing.39 By treatment with intensity, each kilometer
away from the employment centers decreases the housing prices by 0.6%. The average distances
to the nearest employment centers for the treatment group and the control group are about 5km
and 13km respectively. Then the differential impact between the treatment group and the control
group should be 4.8% (8*0.6%), which is consistent with Column (1) and (2). The consistency
between results by groups and by treatment with intensity suggests relative linear relationship
between housing prices and the distances to employment centers.
Housing prices for neighborhoods whose distance to the nearest primary schools are less
39The average unit price for neighborhoods with the distance to the nearest employment centers less than 8km is
about 37,000 RMB, so homeowners in the treatment group earn 185,000 RMB (37000*0.05*100) more than those in
the control group compared to the counterfactual case without the car purchase lottery. To construct the counterfactual,
I assign the extra value in proportion to their average unit prices to the homeowners, so the homeowners in the
treatment group should get 106,000 RMB (57.3%) and homeowners in the control group should get 79,000 RMB
(42.7%). Therefore, homeowners in the control group transfer 79,000 RMB to those in the treatment group.
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than 0.5km (which is the treatment group) increase by about 3% compared to neighborhoods
located more than 0.5km away from the nearest primary schools (which is the control group).
This is equivalent to transferring about 45,500 RMB ($6,825) from homeowners close to primary
schools to those far away from primary schools, approximately 1.5 years of the average disposable
income per capita in Beijing.40 By treatment with intensity, each kilometer away from the primary
schools decreases the housing prices by 4%. The average distances to the nearest primary schools
for the treatment group and the control group are about 0.28km and 0.96km respectively. Then the
differential impact between the treatment group and the control group should be 3.32% (0.68*4%),
which is consistent with Column (1) and (2). The consistency between results by groups and
by treatment with intensity suggests relative linear relationship between housing prices and the
distances to primary schools.
The findings in Table 1.4 and 1.5 are consistent with the modified version of the mono-
centric city model with more than one common destination. The results also imply a large
redistribution across homeowners with different access to common destinations. In the mean-
while, the increased housing prices because of increased willingness to play indicate large values
of developing employment centers and building primary schools to households nearby.
1.6.3 Public Transit
Table 1.6 and 1.7 show the results by access to subways and buses. Month of sample
fixed effects and neighborhood fixed effects are controlled for all columns. Standard errors
are clustered by town. Column (1) and (3) report the results without further controlling for
40The average unit price for neighborhoods with the distance to the nearest primary schools less than 0.5km
is about 33,000 RMB, so homeowners in the treatment group earn 99,000 RMB (33000*0.03*100) more than
those in the control group compared to the counterfactual case without the car purchase lottery. To construct the
counterfactual, I assign the extra value in proportion to their average unit prices to the homeowners, so homeowners
in the treatment group should get 53,500 RMB (54%) and homeowners in the control group should get 45,500 RMB
(46%). Therefore, home owners in the control group transfer 45,500 RMB to those in the treatment group.
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Table 1.4: Impacts of Car Purchase Restriction on Housing Prices By Employment Center
Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*EC within 8km 0.0490*** 0.0472***
(0.00925) (0.00932)
Policy* Dist EC -0.00632*** -0.00636***
(0.00101) (0.000990)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.962
Within R-squared .015 .023 .026 .034
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.5: Impacts of Car Purchase Restriction on Housing Prices By School Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*School Within 0.5km 0.0341*** 0.0284***
(0.00836) (0.00767)
Policy*Dist School -0.0436*** -0.0362***
(0.0100) (0.00950)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
Within R-squared .007 .014 .011 .016
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
28
district-level covariates. Column (2) and (4) report the results by further controlling for annual
district-level disposable income and population density where the neighborhoods belong to.
Column (1) and (2) report the results by estimating Equation (1.7) and Equation (1.8). Column (3)
and (4) reports results by estimating Equation (1.9) and Equation (1.10). Across all specifications,
the results are similar and consistent.
Housing prices for neighborhoods with the distance to the nearest subway stations less
than 1.5km (which is the treatment group) increase by about 3.3% compared to neighborhoods
more than 1.5km away from the nearest subway stations (which is the control group). This is
equivalent to transferring about 48,800 RMB ($7,320) from homeowners close to subways to
those far away from subways, approximately 1.5 years of the average disposable income per
capita in Beijing.41 By treatment with intensity, each kilometer away from the subways decreases
the housing prices by 1.3%. The average distances to the nearest subway stations for the treatment
group and the control group are about 0.75km and 3.38km respectively. Then the differential
impact between the treatment group and the control group should be 3.42% (2.63*1.3%), which is
consistent with Column (1) and (2). The consistency between results by groups and by treatment
with intensity suggests relative linear relationship between housing prices and the distances to
subways.
Housing prices for neighborhoods with less than 30 buses within 500 meters (which is the
treatment group) decrease by about 4.2% compared to neighborhoods with more than 30 buses
within 500 meters (which is the control group). This is equivalent to transferring about 54,100
RMB ($8,115) from homeowners with less than 30 buses within 500 meters to those with more
than 30 buses within 500 meters, approximately 1.7 years of the average disposable income per
41The average unit price for neighborhoods with the distance to the nearest primary schools less than 1.5km
is about 33,000 RMB, so homeowners in the treatment group earn 108,900 RMB (33000*0.033*100) more than
those in the control group compared to the counterfactual case without the car purchase lottery. To construct the
counterfactual, I assign the extra value in proportion to their average unit prices to the homeowners, so homeowners
in the treatment group should get 61,000 RMB (56%) and homeowners in the control group should get 48,000 RMB
(44%). Therefore, homeowners in the control group transfer 48,800 RMB to those in the treatment group.
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capita in Beijing.42 By treatment with intensity, one more bus within 500 meters increases the
housing prices by 0.09%. The average number of buses within 500 meters for the treatment group
and the control group are about 12 and 52 respectively. Then the differential impact between the
treatment group and the control group should be 2.7% (30*0.09%), which is slightly smaller than
the results in Column (1) and (2). This indicates that the impacts by bus access are likely to be
slightly nonlinear.
The findings in Table 1.6 and 1.7 are consistent with the modified version of the mono-
centric city model with more than one transportation modes. The results also imply a large
redistribution across homeowners with different access to public transit. In the meanwhile, the
increased housing prices because of increased willingness to play indicate substitution between
private cars and public transit. This also reveals large values of developing public transit to
households nearby.
Although the estimates of the impacts for separate factors are easier to interpret and
calculate the amount of potential transfers, a model including all possible factors with treatment
intensity is a model with better predictive power. That is, given a set of characteristics (which is
the access to amenity in this case) of any neighborhoods, the average change of housing prices for
such neighborhoods could be calculated based on the estimates of the model. Table 1.8 reports
the results by including treatment intensity of access to employment centers, primary schools,
subways and buses in one equation. Column (1)-(4) present results of different combinations of
these variables, Column (5) includes all of them. Since the variables are correlated to some extent,
the impacts become smaller when including all of them. The impacts of access to employment
42The average unit price for neighborhoods with less than 30 buses within 0.5km is about 28,000 RMB, so
homeowners in the treatment group lose 117,600 RMB (28000*0.042*100) more than those in the control group
compared to the counterfactual case without the car purchase lottery. To construct the counterfactual, I assign the
extra value in proportion to their average unit prices to the homeowners, so homeowners in the treatment group
should get 54,100 RMB (46%) and homeowners in the control group should get 63,500 RMB (54%). Therefore,
homeowners in the treatment group transfer 54,100 RMB to those in the control group.
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Table 1.6: Impacts of Car Purchase Restriction on Housing Prices By Subway Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*Subway Within 1.5km 0.0343*** 0.0332***
(0.00881) (0.00872)
Policy*Dist Near Subway -0.0137*** -0.0128***
(0.00367) (0.00376)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
Within R-squared .009 .018 .013 .02
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.7: Impacts of Car Purchase Restriction on Housing Prices By Bus Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*30 Bus within 500m -0.0435*** -0.0421***
(0.00855) (0.00821)
Policy*No. Bus 500m 0.000949*** 0.000902***
(0.000186) (0.000181)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
Within R-squared .012 .021 .014 .022
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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centers and buses stand out among all four factors.
Table 1.8: Impacts of Car Purchase Restriction on Housing Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy* Dist EC -0.00555*** -0.00550*** -0.00482***
(0.00126) (0.000997) (0.00128)
Policy*Dist Near Subway -0.00597 -0.0107*** -0.00393
(0.00487) (0.00361) (0.00457)
Policy*No. Bus 500m 0.000593*** 0.000789*** 0.000526***
(0.000166) (0.000165) (0.000144)
Policy*Dist School -0.0252*** -0.0266*** -0.00718
(0.00878) (0.00879) (0.00817)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.962 0.962 0.961 0.961 0.962
Within R-squared .036 .039 .023 .026 .04
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES YES
Income YES YES YES YES YES
Population Density YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
1.6.4 Commuting Time
Table 1.9 shows the results for value of commuting time. Month of sample fixed effects
and neighborhood fixed effects are controlled for all columns. Standard errors are clustered by
town. Column (1) and (3) report the results without further controlling for district-level covariates.
Column (2) and (4) report the results by further controlling for annual district-level disposable
income and population density where the neighborhoods belong to. Column (1) and (2) report the
results by looking at commuting time to the city center. Column (3) and (4) reports the results by
looking at commuting time to the employment centers. Across all specifications, the results are
similar and consistent.
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People who would buy cars were there no purchase lottery value one minute of increased
daily commuting time about 0.3% of housing prices, approximately an average of 2,700 RMB
($400).43 Assume that people commute a round trip for 250 days per year, and the houses
benefit them for 10 years before they can buy cars, then hourly value of time is estimated to be
2700∗60
2∗250∗10 = 32.4 RMB, roughly 1.2 times of average hourly wage in 2011.
44 Taking the discomfort
and inconvenience of public transit into account, the value of time is approximately close to wage
rate, which makes the distributional impacts estimated in the same context more reliable. This
estimate also suggests that policies could be fully capitalized into housing values.
Table 1.9: Value of Commuting Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Time to City Center -0.00308*** -0.00285***
(0.000999) (0.000989)
Time to Employment Center -0.00306*** -0.00281***
(0.000872) (0.000859)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
Within R-squared .01 .018 .011 .018
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
43The average individual living area in Beijing is 30 square meters in 2011 according to National Economic and
Social Development Report. The average unit price in Beijing is about 30,000 RMB. Therefore, the value of one
minute of commuting time is calculated by 30000*0.003*30=2700.
44The average hourly wage is about 26 RMB in Beijing in 2011.
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1.7 Robustness Checks
In this section, I conduct a series of robustness checks and placebo tests to address some
potential concerns. First, to address the concern that neighborhoods that are affected by new
subway openings are endogenously different, I restrict the sample to properties that are unaffected
by new subway openings during the data period to get rid of the treatment effects of subway
opening itself. The properties are defined as unaffected if the distance to the nearest subway
station does not change over the data period. The results are reported in Table 1.10-1.15 in the
Appendix. For the ring roads, the estimates for the three groups of neighborhoods within the
fourth ring road become smaller and insignificant but the estimate for neighborhoods outside the
fifth ring road is even slightly larger. The impacts of subways become even larger by restricting
to the unaffected neighborhoods. The impacts of buses and the value of commuting time become
slightly smaller. The rest of the results are quite similar. Overall, the estimates are consistent with
the main results.
Second, to address the concern that the housing purchase restriction may contaminate
the treatment and bias the results, I do a Placebo test, moving the policy to the time of housing
purchase restriction and estimate the same regressions. The results are reported in Table 1.16-1.20
in the Appendix. For the ring roads, the results show no significant effects for neighborhoods
within the second ring road and neighborhoods outside the fifth ring road. But the other two
groups present the opposite impacts, which suggests that the estimates for the these two groups
are underestimated. Similar for the results of employment centers and primary schools. The
results for subways and buses are no longer significant, implying no impacts of the housing
purchase restriction on the housing prices for neighborhoods close to public transit.
Third, I restrict my sample to a balanced panel to deal with the concern that the missing
values are endogenously dropped. The results are reported in Table 1.21-1.26 in the Appendix.
For the ring roads, the estimates for the three groups of neighborhoods within the fourth ring road
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become smaller and insignificant but the estimate for neighborhoods outside the fifth ring road is
quite robust. The rest of the results are slightly smaller but still significant.
Fourth, I report the Conley spatial HAC standard errors, allowing a geographical lag of
24.7km and a time lag of 47 months. I conduct a Moran’s I test for spatial autocorrelation in
arcGIS to determine the order of spatial lags, and conduct a Cumby-Huizinga general test for
autocorrelation in a time series (Cumby and Huizinga, 1992) to determine the order of time
lags.45 Figure 1.11 shows the z-score of the Moran’s I test by distance. The relationship between
z-score and autocorrelation across space is shown in Figure 1.12. At a distance of 24.7 kilometers,
the z-score is the smallest in absolute value (and it is smaller than 1.65). The p-value of the
Cumby-Huizinga test is shown in Figure 1.13, with the largest value at 47 months. A large
p-value indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. Above
all, I choose the geographical lag to be 24.7km and the time lag to be 47 months. The results
are reported in Table 1.27-1.32 in the Appendix. The estimates hold similar or higher level of
significance.
Finally, I compare the results for office buildings and residential housing by conducting
the same set of regressions for office buildings. The results are reported in Table 1.33-1.38 in the
Appendix. Both the scale and significance level of the effects for office buildings is much smaller,
especially for ring roads and primary schools. It makes sense that the closeness to employment
centers and public transit are still factors that companies consider to decide where to locate their
offices, but the closeness to primary schools is no longer important. This suggests that the impacts
I estimate in my main results can be attributed to the changes of people’s willingness to pay
because of the policy.
45The STATA code -actest- is developed by Baum and Schaffer (2013).
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1.8 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper investigates the distributional impacts of an automobile policy targeting air
pollution and traffic congestion. Using monthly neighborhood-level unit housing prices from
China Real Estate Industry Association from September 2009 to September 2014, I employ a
difference-in-differences approach by comparing heterogeneous neighborhoods before and after
the implementation of the lottery. The results suggest large and significant redistribution among
homeowners at different locations.
The findings confirm the predictions of urban economics models and show that increased
commuting cost from the automobile policy could be fully capitalized into housing prices. The
results also indicate that policies targeting air pollution and traffic congestion could have some
indirect and likely unexpected effects on other aspects of the economy. This is policy relevant in
the sense that, as an important piece of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, the subsequent
effects on the connected markets should be taken into account when making policies aiming at
mitigating air pollution and traffic congestion.
However, there are still questions that are not well addressed in this paper. First, in addition
to the redistribution among homeowners at different locations, there is also potential redistribution
among people with and without cars because car owners can easily relocate themselves to cheaper
locations. Unfortunately, I cannot quantify this redistribution without car ownership information
for each neighborhood. Second, the impacts are mainly reduced form estimates given the existing
policy. I do not link the strictness of the policy to its corresponding impacts. With better data
on car ownership, the policy can serve as an instrument variable for car ownership, which
could connect the impacts with the number of cars reduced. Third, I only consider impacts
on equilibrium prices which include all possible adjustment from the supply side. With more
information on the construction of new houses and demolition of old buildings, I could partially
disentangle the impacts from the demand side. With proper data available, I can deal with the
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issues in future work.
Another open question left is whether this policy contributes to increased inequality. One
reason that the car purchase lottery in Beijing was proposed rather than an auction system is
that a lottery system is seen as more equitable.46 Due to data limitation, I can only show some
stylized facts at district level, which may shed some light on this question, without claiming
causal relationships. Figure 1.14 in the Appendix shows the districts in Beijing and they are
categorized into four groups with different colors. I denote the four groups with colors pink,
purple, green and yellow as the first, second, third and fourth groups as they become further away
from the city center. The neighborhoods in my study are mainly located in the first two groups
(i.e. pink and purple).
I look at this question from two aspects: First, I check whether the rich tends to pre-sort
themselves into locations close to the city center or employment centers. Figure 1.15 in the
Appendix shows the district average disposable income as a function of district centroid’s distance
to the city center the year before the policy (2010). At the district level, it suggests that the rich
tends to locate close to the city center. Similar relationship for employment centers is shown in
Figure 1.16 in the Appendix. Second, I check which groups of districts are affected the most
by the policy in terms of car ownership. Figure 1.17 in the Appendix shows the car ownership
per capita for each district group by year. The second and third groups (i.e. purple and green)
are mostly affected but the first and fourth groups (i.e. pink and yellow) are not affected very
much. It is possible that most of people in the first group (i.e. pink) already have cars or they
do not need cars, while people in the fourth group (i.e. yellow) is disconnected to the city and
they are poor so they have low demand for cars. Figure 1.18 in the Appendix show similar effects
for total amount of car ownership. These stylized facts seem to support that the rich are more
likely to pre-sort themselves into locations that have increased values and own cars, hence the
redistribution tends to increase inequality. If so, this seems to contradict part of the policy goals.
46Suggested by Yang et al. (2014).
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This is only suggestive evidence though, solid causal impacts on inequality could be potential
future work.
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1.10 Appendix
1.10.1 Data Construction using arcGIS
To construct the dataset, I first scrape public transit data from Baidu/Google Maps API,
from which I get a layer of subway lines, a layer of subway stations, a layer of bus lines, and
a layer of bus stops. Then I create a layer of neighborhoods, a layer of the city center and
a layer of the employment centers using the longitude and latitude of the neighborhoods, the
city center and the employment centers. The projection I use is North Asia Equidistant Conic
since I need to calculate distance. The extent and mask I use is the city boundary. To construct
the distances, I use Generate Near Table to calculate the nearest distance of the neighborhoods
layer to the employment centers layer, the primary schools layer and the subway stations layer,
respectively. To calculate the number of buses within 500 meters, I first create buffers around each
neighborhood within 500 meters, then I use Spatial Join to count the number of bus stops within
the buffers. To calculate the commuting time, I first generate a raster containing cost information
(in terms of time) of three different modes of commuting, i.e. walking, taking bus, and taking
subway. Then I use Cost Distance to calculate the commuting time and use Value to Point to map
data on the raster to each neighborhood. To generate the cost raster, I need to first reclassify the
layers of bus lines and subway lines to set NoData to be zero since NoData indicates walking.
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Then I use Feature to Raster to transform them into rasters and use raster calculator to combine
them into one cost raster.47
1.10.2 Additional Figures and Tables
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Table 1.10: Impacts By Ring Roads: Unaffected By Subway Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*<2 Ring 0.0181 0.0192 0.0145 0.0161
(0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0125)
Policy*2-3 Ring 0.00907 0.00943 0.00836 0.00881
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0128)
Policy*3-4 Ring 0.0136 0.0141 0.0138 0.0142
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Policy*5-6 Ring -0.0510*** -0.0496*** -0.0487*** -0.0479***
(0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0180)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127 29,127
R-squared 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Within R-squared .026 .027 .026 .027
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
47To calculate the cost in terms of time, I use the following data from Wikipedia: Walking speed is 5km/h, bus
speed in Beijing for rush hours is 20km/h, and subway speed in Beijing is 60km/h.
40
Figure 1.5: Percentage Changes in Housing Prices by Quintiles By Year in Beijing
41
Figure 1.6: Pretrends of Logged Housing Prices By Ring Roads
Figure 1.7: Pretrends of Logged Housing Prices By Access To Employment Centers
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Figure 1.8: Pretrends of Logged Housing Prices By Access To Primary Schools
Figure 1.9: Pretrends of Logged Housing Prices By Access To Subway
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Figure 1.10: Pretrends of Logged Housing Prices By Access To Bus
Figure 1.11: Spatial Autocorrelation By Distance
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Figure 1.12: Interpretation of Moran’s I Test
Figure 1.13: Autocorrelation By Time Lag
45
Figure 1.14: Beijing Districts
46
Figure 1.15: Income and District Centroid Distance to City Center
Figure 1.16: Income and District Centroid Distance to Employment Centers
47
Figure 1.17: Car Ownership per Capita by District Group
Figure 1.18: Car Ownership by District Group
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Table 1.11: Impacts By Employment Center Access: Unaffected By Subway Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*EC within 8km 0.0435*** 0.0392***
(0.0112) (0.0115)
Policy* Dist EC -0.00681*** -0.00653***
(0.000979) (0.00108)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127 29,127
R-squared 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Within R-squared .014 .017 .025 .028
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.12: Impacts By School Access: Unaffected By Subway Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*School Within 0.5km 0.0340*** 0.0291***
(0.00882) (0.00886)
Policy*Dist School -0.0456*** -0.0418***
(0.0106) (0.0104)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127 29,127
R-squared 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.966
Within R-squared .008 .013 .013 .015
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.13: Impacts By Subway Access: Unaffected By Subway Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*Subway Within 1.5km 0.0444** 0.0443***
(0.0170) (0.0169)
Policy*Dist Near Subway -0.0249*** -0.0249***
(0.00857) (0.00868)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127 29,127
R-squared 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.966
Within R-squared .011 .018 .024 .031
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.14: Impacts By Bus Access: Unaffected By Subway Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*30 Bus within 500m -0.0409*** -0.0387***
(0.0101) (0.0101)
Policy*No. Bus 500m 0.000877*** 0.000818***
(0.000231) (0.000235)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127 29,127
R-squared 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Within R-squared .012 .018 .014 .019
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.15: Value of Commuting Time: Unaffected By Subway Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Time to City Center -0.00452** -0.00440**
(0.00205) (0.00210)
Time to Enployment Center -0.00426*** -0.00405**
(0.00158) (0.00163)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127 29,127
R-squared 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Within R-squared .014 .019 .014 .019
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.16: Impacts By Ring Roads: Housing Purchase Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Housing Policy*<2 Ring 0.00201 0.00418 -0.00149 0.00126
(0.00772) (0.00787) (0.00811) (0.00817)
Housing Policy*2-3 Ring -0.00816 -0.00772 -0.00979* -0.00904
(0.00571) (0.00577) (0.00577) (0.00579)
Housing Policy*3-4 Ring -0.0108* -0.0109* -0.0106* -0.0108*
(0.00586) (0.00588) (0.00586) (0.00588)
Housing Policy*5-6 Ring 0.0108 0.0113 0.0150 0.0145
(0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Policy*<2 Ring 0.0218* 0.0232* 0.0170 0.0194
(0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Policy*2-3 Ring 0.0227** 0.0226** 0.0216** 0.0218**
(0.00945) (0.00953) (0.00941) (0.00946)
Policy*3-4 Ring 0.0135 0.0118 0.0133 0.0117
(0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0105)
Policy*5-6 Ring -0.0556*** -0.0529*** -0.0543*** -0.0521***
(0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0162) (0.0167)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.961 0.962 0.961 0.962
Within R-squared .024 .026 .025 .027
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.17: Impacts By Employment Center Access: Housing Purchase Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Housing Policy*EC within 8km -0.00812 -0.00854
(0.00511) (0.00569)
Housing Policy*Dist EC 0.00159*** 0.00172**
(0.000593) (0.000704)
Observations 12,722 12,722 12,722 12,722
R-squared 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Within R-squared .001 .001 .004 .004
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.18: Impacts By School Access: Housing Purchase Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Housing Policy*School Within 0.5km -0.0133*** -0.0136***
(0.00356) (0.00385)
Housing Policy*Dist School 0.0127** 0.0130**
(0.00543) (0.00589)
Observations 12,722 12,722 12,722 12,722
R-squared 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Within R-squared .002 .003 .002 .002
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.19: Impacts By Subway Access: Housing Purchase Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Housing Policy*Subway Within 1.5km -0.00289 -0.00293
(0.00454) (0.00471)
Housing Policy*Dist Near Subway 0.00118 0.00129
(0.000715) (0.000797)
Observations 12,722 12,722 12,722 12,722
R-squared 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Within R-squared 0 0 .001 .001
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.20: Impacts By Bus Access: Housing Purchase Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Housing Policy*30 Bus within 500m 0.00217 0.00204
(0.00350) (0.00350)
Housing Policy*No. Bus 500m -3.14e-05 -3.02e-05
(7.53e-05) (7.55e-05)
Observations 12,722 12,722 12,722 12,722
R-squared 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Within R-squared 0 0 0 0
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.21: Impacts By Ring Roads: Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*<2 Ring 0.00797 0.00946 0.00333 0.00575
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0106)
Policy*2-3 Ring 0.00920 0.00815 0.00783 0.00711
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00990) (0.00991)
Policy*3-4 Ring -0.00776 -0.00972 -0.00777 -0.00967
(0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0110)
Policy*5-6 Ring -0.0471*** -0.0451*** -0.0447*** -0.0433***
(0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160)
Observations 27,206 27,206 27,206 27,206
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
Within R-squared .031 .037 .032 .038
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.22: Impacts By Employment Center Access: Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*EC within 8km 0.0426*** 0.0427***
(0.00878) (0.00897)
Policy* Dist EC -0.00547*** -0.00568***
(0.000954) (0.00103)
Observations 27,206 27,206 27,206 27,206
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.982
Within R-squared .028 .042 .043 .058
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.23: Impacts By School Access: Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*School Within 0.5km 0.0217*** 0.0163**
(0.00713) (0.00653)
Policy*Dist School -0.0288*** -0.0269**
(0.0106) (0.0109)
Observations 27,206 27,206 27,206 27,206
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
Within R-squared .007 .019 .018 .016
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.24: Impacts By Subway Access: Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*Subway Within 1.5km 0.0208*** 0.0208***
(0.00696) (0.00667)
Policy*Dist Near Subway -0.00932*** -0.00851***
(0.00229) (0.00225)
Observations 27,206 27,206 27,206 27,206
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
Within R-squared .008 .023 .013 .026
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.25: Impacts By Bus Access: Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*30 Bus within 500m -0.0252*** -0.0238***
(0.00667) (0.00638)
Policy*No. Bus 500m 0.000643*** 0.000602***
(0.000139) (0.000134)
Observations 27,206 27,206 27,206 27,206
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
Within R-squared .01 .024 .015 .029
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.26: Value of Commuting Time: Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Time to City Center -0.00169*** -0.00147**
(0.000634) (0.000613)
Time to Enployment Center -0.00209*** -0.00188***
(0.000582) (0.000565)
Observations 27,206 27,206 27,206 27,206
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
Within R-squared .006 .02 .01 .024
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.27: Impacts By Ring Roads: Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*<2 Ring 0.0227*** 0.0251*** 0.0175** 0.0211**
(0.00809) (0.00812) (0.00846) (0.00844)
Policy*2-3 Ring 0.0189*** 0.0190*** 0.0174** 0.0178***
(0.00678) (0.00679) (0.00680) (0.00680)
Policy*3-4 Ring 0.00871 0.00695 0.00857 0.00694
(0.00590) (0.00603) (0.00590) (0.00602)
Policy*5-6 Ring -0.0509*** -0.0481*** -0.0484*** -0.0463***
(0.00720) (0.00732) (0.00727) (0.00737)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.026
Within R-squared . . . .
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conley spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The time lag is 60(month), and the spatial lag is 10(km).
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Table 1.28: Impacts By Employment Center Access: Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*EC within 8km 0.0490*** 0.0472***
(0.00601) (0.00605)
Policy* Dist EC -0.00632*** -0.00636***
(0.000644) (0.000658)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.015 0.023 0.026 0.034
Within R-squared . . . .
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conley spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The time lag is 47 (month), and the spatial lag is 24.7 (km).
Table 1.29: Impacts By School Access: Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*School Within 0.5km 0.0341*** 0.0284***
(0.00497) (0.00494)
Policy*Dist School -0.0436*** -0.0362***
(0.00628) (0.00633)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.016
Within R-squared . . . .
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conley spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The time lag is 47 (month), and the spatial lag is 24.7 (km).
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Table 1.30: Impacts By Subway Access: Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*Subway Within 1.5km 0.0343*** 0.0332***
(0.00455) (0.00454)
Policy*Dist Near Subway -0.0137*** -0.0128***
(0.00181) (0.00188)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.009 0.018 0.013 0.020
Within R-squared . . . .
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conley spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The time lag is 47 (month), and the spatial lag is 24.7 (km).
Table 1.31: Impacts By Bus Access: Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*30 Bus within 500m -0.0435*** -0.0421***
(0.00490) (0.00493)
Policy*No. Bus 500m 0.000949*** 0.000902***
(0.000103) (0.000103)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.012 0.021 0.014 0.022
Within R-squared . . . .
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conley spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The time lag is 47 (month), and the spatial lag is 24.7 (km).
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Table 1.32: Value of Commuting Time: Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Time to City Center -0.00308*** -0.00285***
(0.000474) (0.000483)
Time to Employment Center -0.00306*** -0.00281***
(0.000442) (0.000448)
Observations 49,572 49,572 49,572 49,572
R-squared 0.010 0.018 0.011 0.018
Within R-squared . . . .
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conley spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The time lag is 47 (month), and the spatial lag is 24.7 (km).
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Table 1.33: Impacts By Ring Roads: Office Buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*<2 Ring 0.0137 0.0159 0.0122 0.0131
(0.00989) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0116)
Policy*2-3 Ring 0.0157 0.0152 0.0153 0.0145
(0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0155)
Policy*3-4 Ring 0.0190 0.0174 0.0190 0.0175
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0146)
Policy*5-6 Ring -0.0253 -0.0256 -0.0248 -0.0248
(0.0327) (0.0313) (0.0328) (0.0314)
Observations 5,195 5,195 5,195 5,195
R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Within R-squared .014 .017 .014 .018
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.34: Impacts By Employment Center Access: Office Buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*EC within 8km 0.0380** 0.0385**
(0.0170) (0.0169)
Policy* Dist EC -0.00436** -0.00450**
(0.00193) (0.00182)
Observations 5,195 5,195 5,195 5,195
R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Within R-squared .016 .021 .016 .022
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.35: Impacts By School Access: Office Buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*School Within 0.5km 0.00846 0.00744
(0.0123) (0.0124)
Policy*Dist School -0.0343 -0.0269
(0.0303) (0.0318)
Observations 5,195 5,195 5,195 5,195
R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Within R-squared .001 .006 .01 .005
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.36: Impacts By Subway Access: Office Buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*Subway Within 1.5km 0.0235* 0.0218*
(0.0122) (0.0123)
Policy*Dist Near Subway -0.0127** -0.0120**
(0.00558) (0.00562)
Observations 5,195 5,195 5,195 5,195
R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Within R-squared .009 .013 .013 .017
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.37: Impacts By Bus Access: Office Buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Policy*30 Bus within 500m -0.0223* -0.0223**
(0.0114) (0.0110)
Policy*No. Bus 500m 0.000381* 0.000370*
(0.000224) (0.000218)
Observations 5,195 5,195 5,195 5,195
R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Within R-squared .008 .013 .005 .01
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.38: Value of Commuting Time: Office Buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price) log(Price) log(Price)
Time to City Center -0.00283** -0.00275**
(0.00123) (0.00120)
Time to Enployment Center -0.00299** -0.00297**
(0.00142) (0.00135)
Observations 5,195 5,195 5,195 5,195
R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Within R-squared .013 .017 .016 .021
Neighborhood FEs YES YES YES YES
Month of Sample FEs YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES NO YES
Population Density NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by town are reported in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
Transmission Constraints, Intermittent
Renewables and Welfare
2.1 Introduction
To mitigate non-market externalities and decrease reliance on imported fossil fuels, the
U.S. federal and various state governments have subsidized both solar and wind electricity
generation capacity for the past 10 years in various ways. The most widely used direct subsidy to
private developers to date in terms of total electricity generation is the federal production tax credit
(PTC) for wind electricity generation.1 The PTC is a large volumetric based subsidy whereby each
Megawatt Hour (MWh) of electricity produced entitles the renewable asset owner to a deductible
federal tax credit, regardless of the location and wholesale price of the electricity generated.
Total federal payments of the PTC in 2015 were roughly $4.4 billion.2 Driven by both market
1See https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are common policies
at the state level and implicitly subsidize renewables. Investment Tax Credits (ITCs) are common for solar investment.
2The PTC for the U.S. was $.023/kWh of generation through 2016 declining to $.0184/kWh for generation
constructed after 2017. See IRS form 8835 (https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8835.pdf) or this more general
description: http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/734. Among all the states, Texas has the largest
wind capacity at roughly 2.5 times the next closest states (California and Iowa). In Texas, wind generation accounted
for 10 percent of electricity generation in 2015 (See: https://tinyurl.com/kmtadrm).
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conditions and the PTC, in 2015 wind generation was 5.5% of domestic electricity production,
roughly 5 times solar generation and almost 80% of hydroelectric generation according to the
Energy Information Administration.
The structure of electricity markets leads to at least one potential channel for inefficiency
from the PTC. Electricity is both homogeneous and non-storable. As a result, electricity which is
produced at one location must be moved via transmission lines to locations where it is consumed.
If there is insufficient transmission capacity there can be congestion constraints leading to price
discrepancies in the wholesale price of electricity over space (Joskow and Tirole (2005) and Davis
and Hausman (2016)). Popular press has reported how increases in wind capacity are straining
the grid and advocates argue that wind farms require more transmission to fully benefit investors,
ratepayers and federal taxpayers.3
There is reason to believe that transmission line construction cannot be provided efficiently
by the market: they have high fixed costs and low marginal costs, similar to telephone lines, and
therefore prone to natural monopolies (Joskow and Tirole (2005)). As a result, regional electricity
entities like Independent System Operators (ISOs) often plan and facilitate their construction
passing the cost on to market participants. Thus the PTC presents a regulatory federalism issue:
the PTC didn’t include a complementary federal policy which explicitly optimized the electricity
transmission grid in response to new wind capacity. Taken effect in 2016, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) order number 1000 implicitly acknowledges this challenge and
requires that impacted utilities and other regional stakeholders “must consider transmission needs
driven by public policy requirements established by state or federal laws or regulations”.4
This paper estimates the economic benefits of building new large scale transmission
capacity conditional on large increases in wind capacity facilitated by a second best policy like
the PTC. To do so we combine a new theoretical model and structural research design. In the
3Outlets like MIT Technology Review (goo.gl/6s7JDE), Reuters (goo.gl/6s7JDE) and NPR (goo.gl/qHVZwC) all
have been covering this issue recently.
4See https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-plan.asp.
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theoretical model, we extend the electricity transmission constraint framework in Joskow and
Tirole (2005) to wind generation. The Joskow and Tirole (2005) model considers a simple
transmission system with two nodes: one with excess demand (net demand) which serves as an
importer, and the other with excess supply (net supply) which serves as an exporter. Unconstrained
transmission capacity allows trade between the two nodes until nodal prices are equal. Deviations
from a single network price imply congestion in the model. In a straightforward extension, we add
intermittent renewable generation to the model and show how the shadow cost of any transmission
constraint changes with increased intermittent renewable generation. We also show how increases
in transmission capacity decrease price differences between exporting and importing regions
when renewables generate.
In the empirical section we use quasi-experimental variation in the construction of a large
∼$7 billion transmission expansion in ERCOT (Texas’ electricity grid) to estimate economic
benefits of the expansion. The expansion was called the Competitive Renewable Energy Zones
(CREZ) project and added significant transmission capacity between wind generation locations in
west Texas and load centers in the south, central and east Texas. CREZ construction occurred
mainly between 2011 and 2014. We use hourly wind generation, hourly wholesale real time and
day ahead price data, and hourly load data from 2011-2016 to estimate how wind generation
impacts price discrepancies (e.g., through shifts in the net demand and net supply curves) across
space as more CREZ lines are completed.
Identification comes from both the timing of incremental completion of the CREZ expan-
sion over the five years in our sample and inclusion of hour-month-year and day-of-sample fixed
effects. Our identifying assumption is that variation in CREZ construction across the same hour
of a day (e.g., 6am) within a month. Put another way, we rely on changes in the completion of
CREZ lines in the same hour of a day within a month being exogenous to net supply and net
demand shifts. We present evidence in support of this identifying assumption by showing how
price gaps across ERCOT systematically close as a function of CREZ completion.
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The key empirical feature in our approach is that we directly estimate the slopes of the
net supply and net demand curves in ERCOT and combine them with the theoretical model of
congestion and wind generation. The parameters combined with the structure in the theoretical
model allows us to construct congestion costs for each hour in our data and compare them to a
counterfactual in which wind generation would be traded freely until prices between generation
centers in West ERCOT and load centers in North ERCOT, South ERCOT and Southeastern
ERCOT (e.g., Houston) are equal.5 We leverage the unique spatial distribution of wind and load
centers and regulatory history in ERCOT to combine the theoretical and empirical models to
perform the analysis in addition to robustness checks.6 Our approach is far more transparent
and parsimonious than a research design which uses an engineering simulation of the ERCOT
market. A simulation research design focusing on CREZ and wind generation would need to
simulate the entire ERCOT transmission network, the market behavior of each market participant
and the algorithm used to allocate production as a function of bids and load. While this model
might capture some complexities like network loop flows, we provide evidence that our more
parsimonious approach is sufficient for evaluating CREZ impacts.
Consistent with transmission constraints preventing trade, our results show a price gap
of ∼$5/MWh in 2011 before much of CREZ was completed and a ∼$.50/MWh price gap in
2015 after CREZ was mostly finished. The decrease in price dispersion is an economic benefit:
electricity production costs decrease on the whole due to more trade. The main channel for the
benefits is the additional electricity traded between the West and other higher production cost
areas of ERCOT thereby equalizing marginal producers’ costs over space. Using hourly data we
show that traded wind generation is the primary driver of the decreased price dispersion. The
reason wind generation in particular matters is that wind generation occurs in locations where
there is little demand for electricity. Thus transmission lines are required to bring that electricity
5In this sense we build on other structural work like Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002).
6Texas is an ideal case study for three main reasons: First, ERCOT has the largest share of wind generation in the
country. Second, ERCOT has a sufficient history of wind generation data to identify the model. Third, ERCOT is its
own electricity interconnection meaning that imports and exports between Texas and other states are minimized.
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to more valuable load centers. We calculate that annual wholesale electricity market benefits from
CREZ conditional on extant wind generation is roughly $500M/year due to reduced transmission
constraint loss from increased trade.
Since electricity production has unpriced negative externalities (CO2 and other air pollu-
tants) we perform a back of the envelope calculation for benefits of mitigated fossil fuel generation
from increased trade of wind electricity. To do so we use the technique developed in Graff Zivin,
Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and updated in Holladay and LaRiviere (2017) to calculate marginal
hourly forgone emissions in ERCOT due to additional transmission capacity. This technique
complements the more granular emissions work of Fell, Kaffine, and Novan (2017) to size the
non-market impacts of CREZ’s construction through increased trade of wind generation. If 10%
of generation from wind was curtailed in this period due to transmission capacity constraints the
non-market impacts of CO2 alone using a price per ton estimate of $37 are roughly $115M/year.
That number ignores other unpriced pollutants like PM 2.5, making it a lower bound. Adding in
non-market benefits of roughly $200M/year in Fell, Kaffine, and Novan (2017) implies annual
non-market benefits of roughly $300M/year. In sum, we estimate annual benefits of CREZ
conditional on installed wind capacity at roughly $800M/year. Thus, we find that the gains from
CREZ depends on the valuation for non-market benefits and lead to a payback period of less than
9 years.
There are notable asymmetries in the incidence of CREZ. Our net supply and net demand
parameters imply that west ERCOT ratepayers saw their wholesale electricity prices increase
while ratepayers in the rest of ERCOT saw their rates decrease. Thus the mechanism for how
transmission projects are paid for across ratepayers becomes important. Conversely, generators
in west ERCOT received higher wholesale prices while generators in the rest of ERCOT earned
decreased wholesale prices. In ERCOT wind blows at night implying that baseload generators
took the brunt of CREZ’s price decreases in ERCOT outside of the West. For example, in late
2017 ERCOT approved the decommissioning of ∼4,000 MWh of coal fired generation. While
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it is beyond the scope of this paper to make causal statements about retirement decisions, the
decision to retire those plants was certainly not helped by CREZ. Importantly, these incidence
measures are transfers from one set of stakeholders to another so they don’t factor in our benefit
cost analysis. In sum, we find evidence that generators in west ERCOT benefit from CREZ
whereas generators in other ERCOT regions lose.
The policy implications of this paper speak directly to the policy debate playing out in
the popular press on transmission line construction. Our estimates indicate that the benefits of
additional transmission in ERCOT has a payback period of roughly 14 years when not accounting
for carbon and something closer to 9 years when valuing carbon at standard worldwide values of
$37/ton. Insofar as these ERCOT results are externally valid, the social gains from additional
transmission ride very much on how CO2 and air pollution reductions are valued by ISOs. At a
high level, the key metric for external validity is the spatial correlation of renewable generation
and load. The results are likely to hold in Iowa where generation is relatively large compared
to load. In California, roof top solar has tighter spatial correlation meaning that transmission
capacity might be less important.
This paper adds to a growing literature on renewable energy policy in the U.S. There is a
large literature on environmental impacts or possible environmental impacts of wind generation
(Cullen (2013), Novan (2015), Holladay and LaRiviere (2017)). Our work focuses on a different
question: market inefficiencies brought about by policies aimed at increasing renewable genera-
tion. As a result, our work is more in line with how renewables have impacted or can interact with
various market conditions (Callaway, Fowlie, and McCormick (2018), Gowrisankaran, Reynolds,
and Samano (2016) and Cullen and Reynolds (2017)). While don’t investigate investment dynam-
ics empirically like Cullen and Reynolds (2017) and instead focus on transmission expansion’s
impact on extant capacity, we do discuss the implications of transmission expansion on investment
decisions. The only other economics paper to study CREZ we are aware of is Fell, Kaffine, and
Novan (2017) which identifies how wind generation substitutes for different types of fossil fuel
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generation in the rest of ERCOT before, during and after CREZ’s construction and focuses on
non-market implications of CREZ.
Our contribution, however, is primarily on transmission constraints and the economics
of the electricity sector and the challenges of layered national and regional energy policy. In
terms of net supply and net demand, Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) focuses on imported
electricity into California to evaluate the relative efficiency of California’s restructured electricity
markets. More broadly, there is a large literature on how deregulation and market power impacts
strategic bidding behavior of market participants (Puller (2007), Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia
(2008), Mansur (2008), Fowlie (2009), Ito and Reguant (2016), Mercadal (2018)). Further,
ERCOT in particular has received attention related to strategic bidding behavior and efficiency
(Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Hortacsu, Luco, Puller, and Zhu (2017)).
Our research design approach doesn’t address strategic bidding and market power struc-
turally; transmission constraint loss can be reduced directly through increased trade or indirectly
through reduced market power from increased trade. We discuss implications of market power and
also perform robustness checks by trimming our sample to periods were market power is the least
likely to occur but we don’t disentangle to relative import of increased trade versus reductions in
market power from increased trade. The closest paper to ours is Davis and Hausman (2016) which
addresses the impacts of changes in transmission constraints, among other market outcomes, due
to a nuclear plant shutdown. We are not aware of any empirical work in the economics literature
which evaluates the market and non-market welfare impacts of new transmission construction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model
framework. Section 3 introduces basic background about the CREZ project. Section 4 introduces
datasets used in this paper. Section 5 shows level impacts of wind generation on electricity prices
in ERCOT and impacts of wind generation on electricity price discrepancies across geographical
regions. Section 6 calculate transmission constraint loss associated with wind generation and
discusses incidence of the CREZ project. Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Theoretical Model
We use the Joskow and Tirole (2005) framework to define the shadow cost of a trans-
mission constraint then add intermittent renewables to their model. Their model starts with the
simplest possible transmission network: a system with two nodes. Node “A” can export electricity
to a population center in node “B”. Both node A and node B have generation capacity but in
node B, load is often much larger than in node A. In this case it is optimal for node A to export
electricity to node B until prices in the A and B are identical. Thus node A is an exporting
node and node B is an importing node. Only if there are transmission constraints will there be a
discrepancy in prices.
We now formalize the intuition above and extend it so that the node A also has wind
generation capacity. First consider node A in isolation. Consistent with renewable electricity
being must take, the price of electricity in node A is determined by “net load”. We define net
load in node A as load minus wind generation (LAt −Wt) for any period t. Following Joskow and
Tirole (2005), we assume that the price of electricity in node A is equal to linear marginal costs of
fossil fuel generation: PAt = aA+bA(L
A
t −Wt). Similarly, the price of electricity in node B which
is assumed to have no wind generation is also equal to linear marginal costs: PBt = aB+bBL
B
t .
Note that if there is market power in node B, slope coefficient bB encompasses information on
both marginal costs and exercised market power of suppliers.
In both nodes, then, electricity has a positive price determined by the costs of the marginal
fossil fuel electricity generator. For example, LAt −Wt must be supplied by fossil fuel generators
at node A and LBt must be supplied by fossil fuel generators at node B. The linear slope coefficient
defines how increases in fossil fuel generation map to wholesale prices at each node.
In this model, an increase in wind generation decreases the price of electricity at market
settlement point near wind farms (e.g., node A). Conditional on load, inelastic demand of
electricity and must take wind generation implies estimating the price impacts of increased wind
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generation recovers the shape of the marginal cost curve. The magnitude of the decrease is an
empirical question we estimate in the next section.
Now allow trade so that node A can export electricity to node B. For convenience and
consistent with the subsequent data, assume that PAt < P
B
t in the absence of trade. In that case,
node A always exports a weakly positive amount of electricity by assumption. The marginal
cost of exporting a given amount of electricity, Qt from node A to node B is a function of
load, wind generation and costs parameters in node A which we call the “net supply curve”:
PAt = aA+bA(L
A
t −Wt)+bAQt . In the context of traded electricity Qt , the term bA(LAt −Wt) shifts
the intercept of node A’s supply function up and down but does not impact the slope since wind
is must take.7The net supply curve is upward sloping if we plot PAt as a function of Qt since
the marginal cost of generating more electricity from fossil fuels is increasing in the amount of
exports.
Node B’s demand function for imported electricity from node A is downward sloping in
the price charged by node A and the intercept is a function of their own load and cost parameters.
We thus define the net demand function as: PBt = aB+ bBL
B
t − bBQt . Here, bB represents the
cost of node B to procure electricity internally.8 As a result, node B’s net demand function is
downward sloping to reflect the opportunity cost of imports either through additional domestic
fossil fuel production at the node B, or the cost of importing from a third party which is not part
of the explicit model. Without barriers to trade, prices in node A and node B will be equal in
equilibrium.
Lastly, assume there is also a transmission capacity K. The transmission capacity K means
there can be violations of the law of one price between node A and node B. This is represented
in Figure 2.1 which shows how adding wind generation to the Joskow and Tirole (2005) model
impacts the shadow cost of transmission constraints. Q= K∗ is the unconstrained level of trade
7A richer model might include a slight readjust of the merit order when the wind blows which would affect the
slope. That additional complexity is second order to our focus here.
8In a more complicated network, the marginal costs of electricity generators at other nodes also determines the
slope of the net demand curve. This could also be the implicit cost of reducing load to avoid blackouts.
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but K is the constrained level of trade and η is the resultant price discrepancy between node A
and B. The figure also shows how capacity constraints lead to losses through decreased trade
(the shaded triangle) we call a transmission constraint loss (TCL). This loss is not necessarily
a deadweight loss, however, since the costs of adding transmission capacity may outweigh the
gains.
Quantity (MWh)
Price (Dollars/MWh) SA
DB
K
aA + bA(L
A
t −Wt)
aB + bBL
B
t
PAt
PBt
ηt TCL
K∗
bA
bB
Wt increase shifts curve down
Figure 2.1: Impact of change in wind generation on shadow cost of transmission constraint.
Figure 2.1 shows that conditional on a given amount of transmission, η in any given time
period is a function of wind generation conditional on load levels. More precisely, we constrain
the quantity of traded electricity to be K and plug in the export supply and demand equations for
Qt :
η= PB−PA = (aB+bBLBt −bBK)− (aA+bA(LAt −Wt)+bAK)
= aB−aA+bBLBt −bALAt +bAWt− (bB+bA)K (2.1)
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Equation (2.1) explicitly shows the relationship between the shadow cost of the trans-
mission constraint (e.g., η), model parameters and model dynamics. For example, the foregone
benefits of “complete” trade due to transmission constraints varies as the net demand and supply
curves shift up and down due to different net load and wind generation levels. An increase in
wind generation shifts node A’s supply function to the right: since wind is must take generation
it will decrease the cost of meeting a given level of load in node A from fossil fuel generation.
Figure 2.2 shows that when wind generation increases from W0 to W1, the net supply curve shift
to the right. As a result, the price in node A decreases from pA0 to p
A
1 , thus increasing the price gap
between A and B, with more wind generation and transmission constraint level K.9 Put another
way, the shadow cost of a transmission constraint increases with wind generation: ∂η∂Wt = bA > 0.
This makes intuitive sense: there is no change in node B but the price of electricity decreases in
node A. Changes in load in node A and B affect η in a similarly straightforward manner.
This model also shows that the shadow price of constraint is decreasing in capacity:
∂η
∂K = −(bB+ bA) < 0. This is consistent with additional capacity allowing more trade and
therefore a decrease in price discrepancies. In our subsequent empirical analysis, increases in K
can be thought of as the increase in transmission capacity from the construction on CREZ power
lines in Texas.
Figure 2.1 shows the price gap between exporting area and importing area (i.e. η) should
be equal to the sum of the capacity gap (i.e. K∗−K) times the slope of net supply curve (i.e.
bB) and capacity gap times the slope of the net demand curve (i.e. bA). To simplify notation, we
denote4K = K∗−K|K∗ > K, which is the gap between the actual transmission capacity and the
optimal transmission capacity. Note that4K is only positive when K∗ > K and otherwise takes
the value of zero according to this definition. More precisely the price gap is:
9This is only true when there are transmission constraints. So we will use data before the CREZ project to identify
the slope. Same for the slope of net demand curve below.
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Figure 2.2: Net Supply Shock
bB4K+bA4K = η (2.2)
Solving for4K, we have:
4K = η
bB+bA
(2.3)
The transmission constraint loss (TCL) can thus be calculated as the area of the shaded
triangle in Figure 2.1:
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TCL=
1
2
η4K = η
2
2(bB+bA)
(2.4)
In any given time period, we can calculate a TCL for the market with observed η and
estimated bB and bA. We use equation (2.4) to calculate the TCL associated with renewables
when there are binding capacity constraints compared to when there are none.
From a welfare perspective, we can also write down the objective function of the regulator
conditional on a particular level of installed wind capacity. This final step relates TCL to
deadweight loss (DWL) from inefficient levels of transmission investment. To do so we introduce
two additional functions. The first is a joint density of load in node B and wind generation in node
A: F(LBt ,Wt) ∀ t. For simplicity, we ignore load in the exporting region. The second expression is
a convex function governing the cost of transmission expansion: c(K). The function c(K) is a
one time cost paid for K. Thus, optimal expected investment in transmission capacity is given by
following maximization problem:
argmaxK −ΣTt=1
∫ ∫ 1
2
ηt∆KtdF(LBt ,Wt)− c(K). (2.5)
Equation (2.5) is the negative of expected TCLs over some time period T . We subsume
discount factors for simplicity. Recalling that η is a function of transmission constraints K, the
key feature of equation (2.5) is the non-linearity of the product ηt∆Kt in K. This creates the
non-linearities in how TCLs relate to changes in K. Importantly, this model is made more complex
due to the joint probability distribution dF(LBt ,Wt). The interaction of the function is the product
ηt∆Kt and dF(LBt ,Wt) is key innovation of our approach relative to other models of transmission
constraints or wind generation.
Plugging in for the definition of ∆K, η and simplifying, the first order condition is:
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1
2
ΣTt=1
∫ ∫
ηt+(bB+bA)(K∗t −K)dF(LBt ,Wt) =
∂c(K)
∂K
(2.6)
Equation (2.6) shows the well-known three components of supply decisions of a social
planner. The first term η represents the benefits on the extensive margin from increasing trans-
mission capacity by one unit. The second term (bB+ bA)(K∗t −K) = (bB+ bA)∆Kt represents
the benefit on the intensive margin due to increased transmission capacity. Finally, the cost of
additional capacity is given by ∂c(K)∂K which is an engineering calculation.
The analysis to this point ignores all non-market gains from increased transmission
capacity but the model can easily be extended to include them. Since renewables have zero
emissions, there are additional gains from reducing TCLs proportional to the marginal damage
of each unit of renewable generation exported to the importing region. For example, increase
transmission of renewables decreases the need to burn fossil fuels which release CO2 and air
pollutants which harm human health and indirect economic value to the ecosystem. If we assume
that all generation in the importing region is due to fossil fuel generation with some non-market
marginal cost of ψ, then expected additional gains from increasing K are ΣTt=1
∫ ∫
ψ∆KdF(LBt ,Wt).
In calculating benefits from additional transmission capacity in the empirical section we include
these benefits using estimates of ψ taken from the literature. We let ψ vary by time of day and
month of year to reflect changes in marginal emissions over time.
In the empirical section below we take the model to the data in five crucial ways. First,
we estimate the impact of wind generation on ERCOT hub level prices. This provides validation
of within node dynamics. Second, we estimate wind generated annual price dispersion across
ERCOT by year and compare that to increased CREZ completion to verify across node model
dynamics. Third, we estimate net supply and net demand slopes for each ERCOT zone pair.
Fourth, we construct the implied transmission constraint (e.g., Kt) and TCL for each hour in the
data. Fifth, we aggregate hourly TCLs and back of the envelope non-market costs to get annual
estimates of benefits due to CREZ completion. In steps three through five we include a robustness
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check where we allow the net supply and net demand slopes to be non-linear.
Any model must make simplifying assumptions. We discuss in the empirical section the
relationship between both market power and the production tax credit for the model.10 We also
don’t model curtailment decisions of wind generators who might curtail generation during periods
of wind due to negative prices induced by transmission constraints. The presence of curtailment
implies that the market savings from the paper will be lower bounds. A lack of curtailment data
available for ERCOT makes adding curtailment to the analysis implausible.
2.3 Background
In 2014 ERCOT finished construction of a multi-billion dollar expansion of the ERCOT
transmission line network to connect remote windy regions in Texas to populations centers.11
The expansion was long planned and understanding its evolution is useful for understanding our
research design and the broader policy context for how Independent System Operators (ISOs)
participate in transmission expansions.
In the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Public Utility Commis-
sions (PUCs) typically jointly pay for transmission expansion through tariffs. FERC is self-funded
and can levy fees to upstream market participants like electricity producers in order to act as an
independent standard setter and regulator. PUCs can allow distributors to charge rates that will
recover transmission investment costs thus increasing fees to rate payers. As a result, an ISO will
often make the case for transmission line construction but actually assessing payments for the
new construction involves negotiation between a variety of different agencies.
In 2008 ERCOT published a study which laid the groundwork for construction of new
10At a high level, market power increases the within node marginal cost curve and thus increases the net demand
curve for that region. The production tax credit changes none of the dynamics of the model since the model conditions
on wind capacity.
11https://www.texastribune.org/2013/10/14/7-billion-crez-project-nears-finish-aiding-wind-po/.
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transmission lines which would connect remote but windy parts of northern and western Texas to
load centers in the east and south.12 The report followed the Public Utility Commission of Texas
(PUCT) designation of five zones in northwest Texas as Competitive Renewable Energy Zones
(CREZ) predisposed to high potential levels of wind generation. The report analyzed how to add
transmission to the grid under four investment scenarios ranging from low to high wind capacity
levels (12,000 MW to 24,400 MW of installed capacity). At the time, there were roughly 7,000
MW of installed capacity in ERCOT. The ISO’s involvement (ERCOT in this case) in identifying
the usefulness of expanded transmission is typical of how transmission expansions occur.
Table 2.1: Timing of CREZ’s Construction
Year Length (miles) % Length Spend ($ 1000s) % Spend
2009 154.6 0.062 138,089 0.042
2010 478.7 0.253 137,759 0.084
2011 89.8 0.289 90,808 0.111
2012 136 0.344 159,226 0.159
2013 1290.3 0.859 2,427,627 0.895
2014 255.5 0.962 292,428 0.983
2015 39.1 0.977 13,871 0.987
2016 57 1 41,927 1
NOTE: CREZ line construction and spend by date.
All distances in miles and all dollar figures are in thousands of each years’ dollars.
Figure 2.3 shows a snapshot of 2017 windfarm locations in ERCOT (circles of radius
proportional to wind farm capacity), the location of CREZ transmission lines, and the location
of population centers in Texas. The point of CREZ is clear from the Figure: connect windfarms
in the west (node A in the theoretical model) to population centers in north, south and Houston
hubs (node B in the theoretical model). There were three types of construction for the CREZ
infrastructure: new construction, rebuilds and expansions of existing transmission capacity.
Table 2.1 shows the timing of CREZ’s construction by year from 2009 to 2016 in two
12https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0914/ML091420467.pdf.
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different ways: by total miles of construction and total spend of CREZ lines.13 Each row describes
the total miles and dollars for any CREZ project completed in that year in our data. By both
metrics, 2013 stands out as the year in which CREZ construction peaks. As a percent of total
CREZ construction mileage, 2013 saw an increase from 34% to 86% of total. The dollar spent
analog is even more stark as 2013 saw an increase from 16% to 90%.
2.4 Data
We use hourly data from ERCOT to estimate transmission constraint loss (TCL) both
before and after the construction of the CREZ lines. As shown in Figure 2.4, ERCOT is a power
market which contains much of Texas. Moreover, ERCOT is its own interconnection meaning that
trade of electricity between ERCOT and other FERC electric power markets is very small. For
this reason, ERCOT is an ideal area of study because, unlike more integrated markets like CAISO
which imports and exports to other regions, out of ERCOT are less of a concern (Borenstein,
Bushnell, and Wolak (2002)).
The other reason we focus on ERCOT is its large capacity for wind generation over our
2011-2016 study window. Figure 2.5 shows total installed wind capacity in ERCOT over time.
Wind capacity in ERCOT is increasing over our sample period with a sharp rise in capacity
beginning in the second half of 2014. Figure 2.5 also shows that even before much CREZ
expansion, there was a very significant wind capacity presence in ERCOT (> 9,000 MW).
We focus our analysis on price discrepancies across different electricity zones within
ERCOT at different points in CREZ’s construction timeline. ERCOT is divided into four electricity
zones: West, North, South and Houston. ERCOT provides hourly zonal load levels (e.g., electricity
demand), zonal day ahead prices of electricity, zonal real time prices of electricity, and wind
13All data are taken from snl.com’s database, which itself is a curated database from publicly available sources
like ERCOT press releases.
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generation. The day ahead price is the result of a disaggregated bidding process that clears
over 90% of electricity the day before its needed. The real time price is another market which
facilitates any additional electricity needed at the realized delivery time. These markets clear
at more granular levels but we use hourly hub (zonal) prices in our study, as is common in the
literature (Davis and Hausman, 2016).
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 shows how ERCOT zones are divided across Texas, wind capacity
levels over space and county level populations. The figures show wind farms are located in the
West zone (i.e. northwest of Texas) but there are no population centers. In the context of the
theoretical model presented above, the West zone serves as the “node A” exporting electricity to
the other zones when the wind blows. Each of other three zones contains at least one population
center: the South includes Austin and San Antonio, the North includes Dallas, and Houston
includes the Houston MSA.
Figure 2.7 shows the spatial distribution of population and wind capacity. The color of
the circles indicates capacity levels of the wind farms (red having more capacity and green less).
Figure 2.7 shows population by county. The majority of wind capacity lies west and north of the
population centers where load is concentrated.14
We merge several ERCOT datasets for the main analysis: 1) Hourly zone level prices,
which are average nodal prices weighted by load for each electricity zone; 2) Hourly load at the
zone level; 3) Total hourly wind generation data from ERCOT. We also use the CREZ completion
data shown above disaggregated to the daily level. We merge these datasets by their respective
time stamps.15 All merging and analysis were performed with STATA and our code is available
upon request.
14The exception is the South where coastal wind generate electricity. Those coastal winds, though, have a different
temporal generation pattern that the majority of capacity in the North and West. Since coastal wind are highly
correlated with wind on land in west Texas, it creates measure error in our wind generation variable below and
attenuates our estimates toward zero, but would not lead to bias, making our analysis on transmission constraint
losses a lower bound.
15Prices and load data was provided by ERCOT but aggregated by SNL. Wind generation data was directly from
ERCOT.
84
We focus our analysis on year 2011-2016. There are other reasons for choosing this time
period in addition to quasi-experimental variation in transmission capacity from incremental
CREZ completion. First, natural gas prices were relatively flat and had been relatively low since
2009, mitigating their impact on wholesale electricity prices. Second, load levels in ERCOT were
relatively flat, as they were in the rest of the US.
In order to identify the slopes of the net supply and the net demand curves, we take
advantage of net supply shocks and net demand shocks and inelastic hourly demand characterizing
electricity markets. According to the theoretical model, changes in either load or wind generation
in one or both regions will shift the net supply and net demand curves. To identify the net demand
curve we would ideally like to exogenously shift the net supply curve. Alternatively, to identify
the net supply curve we would like to hold the net supply curve fixed and exogenously shift the
net demand curve.
However, due to transmission constraints and not observing unconstrained equilibrium
prices, that standard identification strategy will not work. In our case, though, we can leverage
transmission constraints to identify the net supply and net demand curves. With binding transmis-
sion constraints, an increase in wind generation will only decrease the price of electricity in the
west as the net supply curve shifts out. The reason is the inability to trade. It is as if demand is
perfectly inelastic in the west when there is a transmission constraint with respect to wind driven
price changes. The decrease in price with binding transmission constraints allows us to identify
the slope of the net supply curve as shown in the theoretical section. Similar intuition holds for
identifying net demand. We will discuss the identification strategy in details below.
Ideally, we would like hourly wind generation and load data from each zone. However,
we do not observe wind generation in each zone but rather total wind generation for ERCOT for
each hour as provided by ERCOT. Fortunately, we can rely on the spatial distribution of wind
generation in ERCOT. Since the vast majority of ERCOT wind farms are located in the West zone
(e.g., the net exporting region in the theoretical model), we use total wind generation in ERCOT
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to proxy wind generation in the West zone.16 For the regions containing Dallas and Houston,
we view this as a relatively innocuous assumption given the lack of windfarms in those zones,
but in South ERCOT there does exist some wind capacity. In the empirical section this creates
downward bias if hourly wind generation in different zones is positively correlated. Increasing
wind generation in the exporting region is offset by increasing wind generation in the importing
region. This amounts to contamination in the importing region biasing the effect of “treatment”
(e.g., wind generation’s impact on price discrepancies from transmission constraints) downward
when comparing west Texas to south Texas. Since we estimate net supply and net demand curves
at the region level, we feel this data aggregation issue does not invalidate the analysis.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Real Time Price (West) 43,795 30.01 80.80 -367.6 4,493
Day Ahead Price (West) 43,795 32.25 64.66 -28.07 2,636
Real Time Price (South) 43,795 31.90 79.87 -169.9 4,351
Day Ahead Price (South) 43,795 33.89 63.55 5 2,634
Real Time Price (North) 43,795 31.67 79.52 -22.48 4,484
Day Ahead Price (North) 43,795 33.72 64.06 2 2,635
Real Time Price (Houston) 43,795 32.22 82.03 -55.94 4,374
Day Ahead Price (Houston) 43,795 34.19 63.60 5.010 2,634
Wind Generation 43,795 3,807 2,409 7 13,812
Load (West) 43,795 2,554 454.4 1,599 4,263
Load (South) 43,795 9,465 2,452 5,293 17,329
Load (North) 43,795 12,898 3,546 6,958 25,626
Load (Houston) 43,795 10,895 2,551 6,457 19,929
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the wind generation, price and load at the zone
level. There are several implications. First, load in the West zone is far lower than all other
regions on average, which is consistent with our model assumption (Low load around exporting
16In some specifications, we also assign wind generation to each zone according to their capacities.
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region). The max observed load in the west is less than the minimum observed load in any of the
other zones. Load in the West zone is also lower than wind generation on average, which makes it
possible to export electricity to other population centers with large load (even without accounting
for Western zone fossil fuel generation). Second, the average prices for all the zones in the DA
market range from $32.25-34.13/MWh.17 The average price in the West zone is lower than all
other zones. In theory, without market power or transmission constraints these prices would be
identical.18 In this paper, the key input to the analysis is whether the discrepancies systematically
vary with wind as predicted by the theoretical model and then are ameliorated with new line
construction. Third, real time (RT) prices are systematically lower than DA prices for various
institutional reasons which are beyond the scope of this paper. There is a growing literature
attempting to solve the “DART spread puzzle”. We do, though, estimate separate regressions for
the DA and RT markets but focus on the DA market due to its volume relative to the RT market.
Figure 2.8 shows average electricity prices for West and North ERCOT in our sample
broken out by wind generation deciles. The Figure is consistent with intuition that wind generation
in ERCOT is negative correlation with load in ERCOT; prices are falling in wind generation.
The Figure shows that during high wind days wholesale electricity prices are on average lower
in the West than in the North. The Figure also shows that even though prices are roughly the
same for low wind generation deciles, they are slightly higher in the North, although not in an
economically significant way.
17This is higher than the nodal prices. Hub prices are average nodal prices weighted by load, and nodes around
large load areas usually have high prices.
18Line loss is another possible explanation but it acts as a tax on far away transmission increasing all prices but
theoretically preserving the equimarginal principle across zones.
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2.5 Reduced Form Results
We first investigate how wind generation affects wholesales electricity prices in levels.
This serves to provide evidence of the first order effect that wind offsets higher marginal cost fuel.
In the theoretical model the price impact is the shifting intercept of the net supply curve in the
exporting region. We then investigate the impact of wind generation on price gaps across zones
in ERCOT directly, which is the main contribution of this research.
2.5.1 Wind Generation and Prices
We first aggregate all ERCOT data and estimate the impact of wind on ERCOT wide
average electricity prices controlling for load and many other fixed effects. Given the changes
in transmission capacity over time we pick a single year, 2015, to increase internal validity. To
account for possible nonlinear effects of wind generation and correlation between wind generation
and load, we use a semi-parametric model to estimate the effects. For expositional clarity we
divide hourly wind generation into 13 equal length (1000 MWh) bins ranging from 0-1000 MWh
to 12,000-13,000 MWh, of which the first bin is served as baseline. Because wind generation is
not uniform each bin doesn’t have the same number of observations. We further divide load into
8 bins with an identical number of observations.19 We then estimate the following equation:
Pt =
8
∑
j=1
13
∑
i=1
βi j1{Bini(Wt)}1{Bin j(Lt)}+δhm+λd+ εt (2.7)
where Pt is wholesale electricity price (real time or day ahead prices) at time t, Wt is wind
generation at time t, Lt is load at time t, 1{Bini(Wt)} is an indicator for wind generation bin
19Since we are focusing on the effects of wind generation, we divide wind generation into equal length bin for
easy interpretation. To ensure certain amount of observations in each bin, we further divide load into bins with
same number of observations. We could divide both into equal length bin or both into bins with same number of
observations. The trend of the effects will not be affected much.
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i, 1{Bin j(Lt)} is an indicator for load bin j, δhm is the month-hour fixed effects, λd is the day
fixed effects,εt is the error term. There are 13 wind generation bins. By adding month-hour
fixed effects, identification comes from variation in load and wind within a month and across
all identical hours (e.g., the 2pm hour in May, 2015). By further adding day of sample fixed
effects, we further control for daily factors that could potentially affect prices. Standard errors are
clustered by sample day to account for possible serial correlation within sample day.20 βi j’s are
coefficients of interest, which indicates the price change by increasing wind generation from bin
1 (almost zero) to bin j conditional load level at bin i.
Figures 2.9 show estimation results from equation (2.7) for day ahead for ERCOT-wide
prices (RT price results are larger and shown in the Appendix). Each subplot describes the size of
a load bin and the y-axis shows the change in hourly DA prices. For all load levels electricity
prices visually decrease as wind generation increases. The differences across wind generation
levels are not always statistically significant but within a load bin the pattern is clear. We do
not observe higher effects for large load bins. The pattern is more stark for real time than day
ahead prices. There is an approximate $0.5/MWh decrease in average day ahead time prices
and $0.7/MWh decrease in average real time prices per 1GWh increase in wind generation. The
former is about 1.5% of the average electricity prices, while the latter is about 2.2% of the average
electricity prices.
There are several implications from the results: First, wind generation decreases electricity
prices averaged at the hub level. We take this as evidence that short run variation in wind
generation can shift the net supply curve as indicted by the model. Therefore the primitive
extension of the Joskow and Tirole model appears valid: when wind generation increases, it
offsets fossil fuel generation.21
Second, the effects of wind generation on prices appear linear conditional on all load
20We also cluster the standard errors by sample week in one of our robustness checks to account for serial
correlation within a week.
21The results are even more stark when doing the same analysis for the west region only.
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levels (e.g., within subplot fixed effects seem roughly linear). We assume a linear net supply
and net demand curves leveraged below as a result. If net supply and net demand curves are
nonlinear, we would observe nonlinear effects of wind generation at different wind generation
and load levels as well. Thus, we use linear specifications in our following analysis. We could
straightforwardly extend the analysis to be non-parametric, however.
Third, there is no evidence that the price effects of wind generation on electricity prices
vary systematically by load (e.g., across subplot effects). At the hub level, then, what the load level
is on average when the wind blows may be a second order concern. We discuss this implication
in more detail below.
2.5.2 Wind Generation, CREZ and Price Discrepancies
In this section, we test whether wind generation increases price discrepancies across
regions, as posited in the model of renewables and transmission constraints presented above. We
test whether the price discrepancies decrease after new CREZ transmission lines are completed.
We later estimate the slopes of the net supply and net demand curves and TCLs for each hour
with different wind generation and CREZ completion levels in the next section.
In order to show evidence of transmission constraints, we estimate the following equation:
ηt = α0+α1CREZt+θ1(Wt−LAt )+LBt θ2+ εt (2.8)
where ηt is the price gap between the west zone and one of the other zones at time t (Node B
price minus Node A price in the theoretical model), Wt is the wind generation in the west Texas
at time t, LAt is load in west Texas at time t, L
B
t is load in other ERCOT regions at time t, CREZt
is the percentage of CREZ completion (We denote %100 as 1) as a function of time. We thus
estimate three unique regressions, one for each west/non-west zone pair. For example the average
2012 CREZ value is .344 and .859 in 2013. Wt−LAt is net supply and LBt is net demand calculated
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from the hourly data, both of which serve as control variables. The error term εt is idiosyncratic.
α0+θ1(Wt−LAt )+LBt θ2 is the average price discrepancy before the CREZ program at different
levels of net supply and net demand. In order to construct the average price discrepancy, we will
take expectations of E[ηt ] to recover mean price discrepancies. The parameter of interest is α1
which is the price discrepancy impact at full CREZ construction (i.e., % 100 completion when
CREZt = 1). We expect E[ηt ]to be positive in presence of transmission constraints. We expect α1
to be negative since the model shows new transmission lines cause price discrepancies to decrease
with lower transmission constraints. Standard errors are clustered by sample day to account for
possible serial correlation within sample day. In the Appendix, we show robustness checks where
standard errors are clustered by sample week to allow more possible serial correlation.
While the above regression examines the impacts of CREZ’s completion on the price
gap between regions, we also quantify the joint impacts of wind generation and CREZ on price
discrepancies by estimating the following equation:
ηt = α+β0(Wt−LAt )+ γ0LBt +β1CREZt× (Wt−LAt )+ γ1CREZt×LBt +δhmy+λd+ εt (2.9)
where δhmy’s are the year-month-hour fixed effects, ηd’s are the day fixed effects, all else as
above. The coefficients of interest are those on the variables representing the net supply and net
demand curves. (Wt −LAt ) is net supply; it is increasing in wind generation and decreasing in
load in west Texas (e.g. node A from the theory model). LBt is net demand; it is increasing in
load in other ERCOT regions (e.g. node B in the theory model). β0 and γ0 are the impacts of
decreases in net supply shock and increases in net demand shock on price discrepancies in the
absence of CREZ lines. The model predicts them to be positive if transmission constraints bind.
β1 and γ1 represent the marginal impact of CREZ construction on net supply changes and net
demand changes. The theoretical model predicts them to be negative if CREZ relieves congestion
allowing wind generation to be more easily traded with more transmission lines. Thus, we test
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the null hypothesis that H0 : β1 = 0 against the alternative that H0 : β1 < 0. Further, if the CREZ
expansion completely eliminated the TCLs, we expect that β0 =−β1.
By adding year-month-hour fixed effects and day fixed effects, variation of identification
mainly come from variation within a year-month across a specific hour (e.g., 2pm) as before.
In using this short run variation for identification we are more confident that load and wind
generation are exogenous to fossil fuel input prices which aren’t likely to vary systematically
within a year-month, let alone a year-month-hour. We thus rely on these fixed effects to control
for variation in wholesale electricity prices due to longer run changes in fuel input prices.22 In
some regressions, we only add year-month-hour fixed effects (without sample day fixed effects)
to allow more identifying variation.
2.5.3 Price Discrepancy Results
Table 2.3 shows results from Equation (2.8) where we don’t allow CREZ completion to
interact with the net supply nor net demand curve for both DA and RT prices. This table shows
CREZ completion impacts on price differences over space conditional on net supply and net
demand. Column (1) (2) show results between the West zone and the South zone, Column (3)
(4) show results between the West zone and the North zone, and Column (5) (6) show results
between the West zone and the Houston zone. Column (1) (3) (5) are results for real time markets,
and Column (2) (4) (6) are results for day ahead markets. In this table and all tables below, net
supply and net demand are in units of 1,000MWh (or 1 GWh).
We can use Table 3 to get high level impacts of the CREZ line construction. From Table
2, average wind generation is 3.8 GWh, average load in the West is 2.6 GWh, and average load in
the South is 9.5 GWh. Column (2) shows that the average DA (RT) price gap between the West
22Residents usually sign up relatively long contracts with utility and the retail price is also different from the
wholesales price, so demand (load) will not be endogenously affected by wholesales prices in short run. Wind
generation has almost zero marginal cost, hence wind farm owners will always want to bid zero to sell their electricity,
so they will not be affected by wholesales prices in short run either.
92
Table 2.3: Impacts of CREZ on Price Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South DA North RT North DA Houston RT Houston DA
Percent Completion -5.864*** -4.650*** -6.206*** -5.353*** -5.511*** -4.322***
(0.632) (0.334) (0.462) (0.290) (0.654) (0.322)
Net Supply (West) 0.817*** 0.535*** 0.779*** 0.491*** 0.960*** 0.575***
(0.0526) (0.0259) (0.0407) (0.0241) (0.0785) (0.0264)
Net Demand (South) 0.105 -0.00994
(0.0714) (0.0291)
Net Demand (North) 0.0180 -0.0329**
(0.0268) (0.0154)
Net Demand (Houston) 0.247*** 0.136***
(0.0771) (0.0290)
Constant 3.492*** 3.975*** 4.251*** 4.578*** 1.774* 2.492***
(0.723) (0.334) (0.621) (0.313) (1.010) (0.374)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.022 0.107 0.056 0.193 0.013 0.111
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
zone and the South zone is 3.8+ 0.54× (3.8− 2.6)− 0.01× 9.5 = $4.35/MWh ($5.5/MWh).
After the CREZ construction, the price gap drops by $4.65/MWh ($5.8/MWh). Results in other
regions can be interpreted similarly. The impacts of CREZ are large in all regions and don’t
qualitatively change in size (e.g., the value of the CREZ coefficient is roughly the size of the
average price gap). These finds are consistent with CREZ relieving congestion.
Figures 2.10 shows results by replacing CREZ percentage completion in (2.8) by a set of
year dummies. This highlights the evolution of how the wind weighted price gap changes over
time. In Figure 2.10, price gap decreases each year as CREZ lines are completed. The biggest
drop in the price gap is in 2011 and 2012 despite only 15.9% of CREZ being completed at that
time. The large drop is consistent with building transmissions lines that are likely to have the
biggest impact in prices first. This makes sense: a regulator constructing a large infrastructure
project should build in places that have the highest marginal benefit first. Also, the price gap
increases slightly in 2016. One possible explanation is that wind capacity in 2015 increases while
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CREZ construction is effectively fixed. Lastly, we take this as evidence that the first order effects
of CREZ can be inferred using a model which doesn’t recreate the entire ERCOT transmission
network.
Table 2.4: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Day Ahead Price Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South DA South DA North DA North DA Houston DA Houston DA
Net Supply (West) 2.066*** 1.662*** 2.154*** 1.665*** 2.200*** 1.725***
(0.119) (0.104) (0.103) (0.0948) (0.108) (0.0990)
Net Demand (South) -0.0923 0.000750
(0.446) (0.203)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -1.980*** -1.625*** -2.158*** -1.662*** -2.044*** -1.662***
(0.127) (0.111) (0.108) (0.100) (0.115) (0.108)
Net Demand (South)*Percent 0.0582 0.0958
(0.473) (0.224)
Net Demand (North) -0.0984 0.00351
(0.0802) (0.127)
Net Demand (North)*Percent 0.110 0.0584
(0.0866) (0.139)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.396** -0.260
(0.185) (0.171)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent 0.669*** 0.609***
(0.209) (0.204)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.415 0.652 0.526 0.784 0.470 0.710
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.4 reports the results from Equation (2.9) for day ahead markets when we allow
CREZ to interact with the net supply and net demand curves. Real time market results are in the
Appendix. Column (1) (2) show results between the West zone and the South zone, Column (3)
(4) show results between the West zone and the North zone, and Column (5) (6) show results
between the West zone and the Houston zone. For all columns, year-month-hour fixed effects
are added, which controls for hourly pattern of prices within sample month. Column (2) (4) and
(6) further control for sample day fixed effects, then the identifying variation only comes from
variation across a given hour in a month not common to hours in the same day. Column (2) (4)
and (6) are our preferred specification.
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The primary coefficients of interest are the interactions of CREZ with the net supply
and net demand curves. Before CREZ, an increase in the net supply (Wt − Lt) in the West
zone of 1GWh increased the price gap between the West zone and the South zone increases by
$2.154/MWh in day ahead markets. The increased price discrepancy when wind generation
increases is consistent with transmission constraints. Comparing full completion of CREZ to
no CREZ project (e.g., CREZ goes from 0 to 1), the impact of a net supply increase on price
dispersion drops by $2.158/MWh in day ahead markets. We take this as evidence that the
strategic behavior studied in previous work is not a primary factor in the price spreads across
zones in ERCOT due to wind generation although we discuss extensions in the discussion section
(Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Hortacsu, Luco, Puller, and Zhu (2017)).
Taken together, an increase in net supply led to no increase in price dispersion after CREZ
completion. The relative magnitudes of wind generation and load in the west shown in Table 2
are consistent with wind generation being the reason. As before, Figure 2.11 show the impacts of
net supply increases on price dispersion by year. The marginal impact of net supply increases on
price dispersion clearly falls over time as before.
These results are consistent with transmission constraints in the theoretical model. After
the full completion of the CREZ project, wind generation has almost no statistically significant
effect on price dispersion indicating that post-CREZ there is enough free transmission capacity
to trade wind generation across space. The effects of net demand is almost zero in most of
the specifications, indicating relatively flat net demand curves. Results in other regions can be
interpreted similarly. Figure 2.11 shows the marginal impacts of net supply by year as we did
with average price gaps visually showing identical intuition.
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2.6 Transmission Constraint Losses and Incidence of CREZ
2.6.1 Transmission Constraint Losses
The theoretical model gives us a framework to quantify foregone gains from increased
trade between exporting and importing regions (i.e. TCLs). In order to do so, we first estimate the
slopes of the net supply and net demand curves directly. Whereas in the regression specifications
above we estimated the impact of wind generation on the price gap between two zones to test for
evidence of transmission constraints, we now estimate the slope of the net demand and net supply
curves directly using price levels.
To identify net demand and net supply slope coefficients, we would like to take advantage
of exogenous net demand shocks to estimate the slope of net supply curve and an exogenous net
supply shock to identify net demand. However, there are endogeneity issues with that simple
identification strategy in our context share by estimating supply and demand curves for a standard
consumer good. When we estimate the slope of net demand curve, it needs to be held unchanged
when net supply shock occurs. Hence, we need to control for net demand when we are looking at
how net supply change affect prices. Similarly, we need to control for net supply when we look at
how net demand change affect prices. As a result, we would have to include both net demand and
net supply in the same regression and they serve as each others’ control.23
Our identification strategy for both curves relies on inelastic demand, the must take nature
of wind generation and the presence of transmission constraints. First, assume that there are
capacity constraints such that there is a price gap between the exporting region (node A) and
importing region (node B). In practice, we can trim our estimating sample to hours where there
23There is non-trivial correlation between net demand and net supply stemming from correlation between load
and wind generation, and correlation between load across zones. This correlation would contaminate both estimates
without adequate controls and we are not convinced that two-way fixed effects would control for all correlation of
net supply and net demand. The normal instruments for wind generation and load (e.g. wind speed and weather
variables like temperature) cannot solve the potential correlation issue either since they don’t satisfy the exclusion
restriction. Therefore, we propose a unique method in our context taking advantage of the constrained prices in
importing and exporting regions to estimate the slopes.
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is a price gap between west ERCOT and other zones. As shown in Figure 2.2, when there is a
positive net supply shock, which shifts the net supply curve to the right (or downwards), the price
in the West will drop.24 Using only net supply shocks from wind generation and price change
in the exporting region (node A in the theory model, West Texas in ERCOT), we can identify
the slope of the net supply curve (e.g., bA in the theoretical model) conditional on existence of
transmission constraints. Put another way, during periods in which the transmission constraint
binds, variations in load and wind generation in the exporting region trace out the export region
net supply curve, and variations in load in the import region trace out the import region net
demand curve.25 Specifically, the slope term is given by:
bA =
pA1 − pA0
W1−W0 (2.10)
Similarly, as shown in Figure 2.12, we use demand shock from load in Node B to identify
the slope of the net demand curve under transmission constraints. When load in Node B increases
from L0 to L1, the net demand curve shift to the right. As a result, the price in Node B increases
from pB0 to p
B
1 . Therefore, the slope of the net demand curve (e.g., bB in the theoretical model) is
given by:
bB =
pB1 − pB0
L1−L0 (2.11)
Since the formula for slopes of net supply and net demand curves from Equation (2.10)
and (2.11) are conditional on existence of transmission constraints, we use the response of prices
on net supply shock and net demand shock under transmission constraints to identify the slopes.
24The exception is if there is no capacity constraint and the net demand curve is fully flat.
25Without binding transmission constraints, this identification strategy does not work and the normal supply and
demand endogeneity woul persist.
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In our analysis below, we restrict the estimating sample to time periods with a price gap between
the West and any other zone of at least $2/MWh. Qualitative results are identical when we
trimmed the estimating sample to include time periods to include only 2011-2013 before CREZ
completion, which we show in the Appendix. Thus, we condition on there being evidence of
transmission constraints consistent with the theoretical model to identify net supply and net
demand parameters.
On the trimmed sample, we estimate the slopes of the net supply and net demand curves
by the following equations:
pAt = α+β(Wt−LAt )+ γ2LBt +δhmy+λd+ εt (2.12)
pBt = α+β2(Wt−LAt )+ γLBt +δhmy+λd+ εt (2.13)
where pAt is the price in the West, p
B
t is the price in any other zones, all else are the same as above.
The absolute value of β in Equation (2.12) gives us the slope of the net supply curve, which is
identified from net supply shock from either increasing wind generation or/and decreasing load in
Node A under transmission constraints as Equation (2.10). Similarly, γ in Equation (2.13) gives
us the slope of the net demand curve, which is identified from net demand shock from increasing
load in Node B under transmission constraints as Equation (2.11).
By adding year-month-hour fixed effects and day fixed effects, variation of identification
mainly come from variation within a year-month across a specific hour (e.g., 2pm) as before.
Identifying the parameters with short run variation means load and wind generation are exogenous
to fossil fuel input prices which aren’t likely to vary systematically within a year-month, let
alone a year-month-hour. We thus rely on these fixed effects to control for variation in wholesale
electricity prices due to longer run changes in fuel input prices. Note that β estimated above is
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expected to be negative, so we take the absolute value for the slope and calculation below.
Table 2.5: Identification of Net Supply and Net Demand Curves West and North DA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P(North) P(West) P(North) P(West) P(North) P(West)
VARIABLES P(Gap)> 1 P(Gap)> 1 P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 5 P(Gap)> 5
Net Demand (North) 0.705*** 1.030*** 0.543** 1.024*** 0.609** 1.013***
(0.225) (0.298) (0.237) (0.333) (0.269) (0.325)
Net Supply (West) -0.804*** -2.226*** -0.766*** -2.438*** -0.724*** -2.272***
(0.156) (0.194) (0.192) (0.248) (0.223) (0.311)
Observations 10,371 10,371 7,326 7,326 4,421 4,421
R-squared 0.748 0.762 0.861 0.855 0.920 0.900
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.5 shows parameter estimates from equations (2.12) and (2.13) on the 2011-2016
data for the West Zone and the North Zone. Estimates from the South and Houston zones
are available upon request, but we don’t provide them here in the interest of brevity. We trim
sample where the price difference between the west and other zones is at least $2/MWh for all
analysis. We also show how point estimates remain very stable as we change the strength of
the price dispersion in the estimating sample to be more aggressive (gap of $1 or more) to more
conservative (gap of $5 or more). Results for the subset of hours pre-CREZ completion in 2014
is shown in the Appendix and offer very similar point estimates with larger standard errors, as
expected given the smaller sample.26
Our main specification is when the price gap is at least $2/MWh in Table 5 columns
(3) and (4). Due to us leveraging price dispersion which we attribute to a binding transmission
constraint as our identification strategy, the slope coefficients on net demand from the North and
26We’ve also estimated this model on the entire sample. In those specifications the magnitude of the slope
coefficients falls slightly, which is consistent with changing net supply and net demand curves having less of an
effect on local prices when electricity can be traded freely.
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net supply from the West are .543 an -2.438 respectively. The table shows the coefficients are
consistent across specifications. Both coefficients are statistically significant. The estimated signs
are reversed relative to the theoretical model since increases in the net supply curve decrease
prices in ERCOT West, whereas the opposite is true in ERCOT North for net demand. The
Appendix describes a semi-parametric technique we use to infer if there are non-linearities in
the net demand and net supply curves between the west and the North. We find no significant
evidence of non-linearity in the net demand curve and modest increasing net supply slope for
high levels of net supply (14% increase significant at the 10% level).
Robustness Checks
Given the importance of the point estimates for subsequent calculation of transmission
constraint loss, we include several robustness checks in the Appendix. First, we allow error terms
to be autocorrelated within sample week rather than sample day to be more conservative. Table
2.8-2.10 show that the standard errors increase slightly but the significance levels do not change.
Second, the CREZ project was almost finished before April 2014, but wind capacity levels rose
rapidly afterward, which may bias our point estimates on the interaction term downward since
any transmission constraints would be exacerbated. We report the results in Table 2.11-2.13 by
only including data before April 2014. The results become slightly larger in general as expected.
Third, we control for loads from all regions to allow potential interactions among those markets
in Table 2.14-2.16. The results do not change significantly. Finally, we’ve run all specifications
without controls to be more directly in line with the theoretical model (e.g., no controls for load in
the other zone) and all point estimates are very similar. Those results are available upon request.
In sum, all robustness checks show consistent results with our main specification.
Market Power
There is a large literature which shows that market power in electricity markets sig-
nificantly influences prices, including in ERCOT (Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Hortacsu,
Luco, Puller, and Zhu (2017)). Market power occurs when a single electricity supplier is able
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to influence market price. In the theoretical model, prices increases from load increases can
be from either increasing marginal costs of electricity or increasingly exercised market power.
Transmission constraints preventing trade in electricity markets preventing trade across nodes
and hubs could certainly contribute to market power in ERCOT.
Transmission constraints can cause price increases due to both lack of trade and increased
market power due to inability to trade. There is a distinction between price increases due to lack
of trade and market power induced price increases. Price increases due to lack of trade imply that
the lowest cost producers to service an entire market are not producing. Price increases due to
market power imply that the lowest costs producers can produce, but that market clearing prices
are above costs. From a welfare perspective, then, the precise mechanism through which prices
increase in the presence of transmission constraints, lack of trade or market power from lack of
trade, doesn’t matter. If increased trade reduces prices then it reduces transmission constraint
loss.
While our research design doesn’t allow us to fully parse between sources for transmission
constraint induced price increases (e.g., lack of trade versus market power), we can determine if
some of our results are consistent with market power. Previous research highlights that market
power is likely to be largest during highest demand hours when a single firm can impact market
prices (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002)). In order to determine if market power affects
the net supply and net demand curve estimates, we run our main empirical specification trimming
the sample to exclude the top 10% of load hours for the west and north ERCOT regressions and
report them in the Appendix. These high load hours would be serviced by the steepest part of the
MC curve in north ERCOT, which would be even steeper if market power were exercised. Their
inclusion would thus make the net demand curve steeper and excluding them should make the net
demand curve flatter. There should be no effect on the net supply curve estimate. Thus, if we
find a flatter estimated net demand curve it is consistent with high load hours being serviced by a
steeper part of the north’s marginal cost curve where market power is likely to be exercised.
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We estimate net demand and net supply curve slope coefficients of .385 and -2.465 with
the trimmed sample (see Table A11), compared to point estimates of .543 and -2.438 reported in
the main specification in this section. The change in the point estimate is 29% which we view as
moderate. Consistent with economic intuition, there is no impact on the net supply curve. The
point estimate for the slope of net demand curve is slightly lower, though, meaning that the curve
is estimated to be slightly flatter. This is consistent with the theoretical model: by trimming the
highest load hours which are serviced by the steepest part of the North’s marginal cost curve, the
estimated net demand curve is flatter. While far from parsing between transmission constraint
loss attributable to lack of trade versus market power from lack of trade, we view this as at least
consistent with the possibility of reductions in market power being attributable to the CREZ
expansion.
It is beyond the scope of this paper and would require a different research design to
precisely disentangle the impacts of lack of trade versus market power from lack of trade. Most
importantly, benefits from reduced market power attributable to more transmission capacity are
benefits that matter for welfare. Even if all benefits from increased transmission capacity were to
accrue due to market power there would still be welfare gains from the policy, although incidence
from the policy would be different.27
The Production Tax Credit
Wind investment was subsidized through the Production Tax Credit (PTC) over the course
of our study. The PTC served to increase the level of wind investment relative to a baseline of
no PTC. Wind generation is must take so that there is no strategic component to deploy wind
generation: when the wind blow wind farms generate. In the model, this is the shifting of the net
supply curve in the exporting node. Thus, the existence of the PTC doesn’t impact our theoretical
nor empirical model for any given level of installed wind capacity.28
27To do a full welfare analysis in that case, the reduced producer surplus from market power would be partially
offset through increased consumer surplus. Our discussion of incidence below has flavors of this.
28Insofar as the PTC did increase installed wind capacity over our sample there are two implications. First, it makes
all of our subsequent transmission constraint loss calculations below lower bounds since wind capacity increased
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2.6.2 Calculating TCLs
The main contribution of the paper is leveraging the estimated slope coefficients to
determine what the increase in equilibrium electricity trade would have been without transmission
constraints. We focus the exposition here on hourly TCLs, the distribution of those TCLs, and
what drives them in the model. As shown in the theory section, we can use the estimated net
supply and new demand coefficients and the theoretical model’s structure to calculate the spending
saved by the CREZ project due to increased trade. In any hour where we observe price differences
between west Texas and other ERCOT zones, we can use the estimated slopes to determine what
equilibrium prices and total traded electricity would be without transmission constraints. By
summing across all hours we do a simple cost-benefit analysis for the project. Transmission
capacity was desired because the wholesale price of electricity was too high in load centers
(North, South, and Houston) and too low near the majority of windfarms (e.g., West) and there
was insufficient capacity to facilitate renewable electricity trade. Put another way, estimating the
slopes of the net supply and net demand curve combined with the theoretical model provides us
the opportunity to back out the transmission capacity shortfall, ∆Kt , for each hour when there is a
price gap as shown in equation (2.3). Equation (2.4) then shows how the imputed ∆Kt maps to a
particular hour’s TCL.
We start by showing the imputed hourly ∆Kt as a function of ERCOT wind generation.
These values are a function of the estimated net supply and net demand slope coefficients
between the West Zone and the North Zone by year as show in equation (2.3) and observed price
discrepancies. We focus on these two Zones due to how well they map to the theoretical model.
Figure 2.13 shows the yearly imputed transmission capacity gap.29 Each point represents
a single imputed hourly ∆Kt using the formula derived in the theoretical section. In 2011,
over the sample but we perform the TCL calculations assuming 2011 levels of capacity. Insofar as increased capacity
biases our coefficients, our pre-April 2014 robustness check addressed this issue.
29In this Figure we’ve dropped the highest observed 20 hours of DA wholesale electricity prices. Those types
of price spikes often occur due to unexpected outages. This trimming procedure narrows the focus to transmission
constraint related price differences.
103
when CREZ is still in its early stages, we observe a strong positive relationship between wind
generation on the transmission gap. Recalling equation (2.3), the non-linearity in Figure 2.13
reflects how wind generation correlates with the net supply and demand curve. The 2011 subplot
highlights how, in the context of transmissions constraints, correlation between wind generation,
load and the slope of the net supply and demand curves jointly determine the implied level of
transmission congestion (e.g., a congestion analog of Callaway, Fowlie, and McCormick (2018)).
There is an increasing convex relationship between wind generation and implied transmission
constraints. The positive relationship still exists in 2012 and 2013 albeit less intensely. By
2014, the positive relationship no longer exists. In 2016, there is a mild rebound consistent with
continued increases in wind capacity but stagnant transmission capacity. This is evident in the
Figure 2.13 by observing the support of observed hourly wind generation levels increasing above
2014 and 2015 levels.
The transmission capacity gaps shown in Figure 2.13 map to hourly TCLs. Figure 2.14
aggregates these hourly observations to show the annual TCL aggregated across all of these hours
and across all zones and includes 95% confidence intervals are calculated by delta method. Figure
2.14 shows TCLs when the transmission gap between the West and the North is positive and
there is positive wind generation. The Figure shows annual Pre-CREZ losses on the order of
$500M/year dropping to nearly zero in 2014 and 2015. Losses then rise again in 2016. These
estimates are likely lower bounds since total wind capacity in 2011 was roughly 10,000 MWs
and 11,000 MWs or more starting in 2013. As a result, the TCLs mitigated by CREZ would
have been higher had the additional wind capacity been present in 2011. We don’t make a claim
about CREZ’s impact beyond the $500M/year level post 2013 because that would require us to
determine how CREZ interacted with windfarm development decisions. Thus, we conclude that
annual TCLs mitigated by CREZ were at least roughly $500M/year.
In addition to market impacts, there are also non-market impacts of CREZ. With trading
possible, wind generation offsets fossil fuel generation in non-west ERCOT. We use hourly
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marginal emissions estimates for CO2 using the technique developed in Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and
Mansur (2014) and updated in Holladay and LaRiviere (2017). To map the implied transmission
shortfalls to tons of CO2, we use hourly marginal emissions estimates from Holladay and
LaRiviere (2017) across all hours and all zones. Using $37/ton, a standard carbon price measure,
the CO2 costs mitigated by CREZ are on the order of 31,000,000 ∗ $37 = $1.15B per year in
2011 if the entire transmission capacity gap were curtailed or lost on lines, roughly double the
market impacts. That is not what actually occurs, though, and curtailment rates are difficult to
know given the lack of data. The U.S. Department of Energy’s market report30 shows suggestive
evidence that curtailment decreased rapidly as CREZ was constructed from a height of 17% in
2009 to roughly .3% in 2014. We assume 10% curtailment attribute to congestion to give CO2
benefits of roughly $115M/year. This is in addition to the roughly $200M in non-market benefits
from CREZ estimated by Fell, Kaffine, and Novan (2017) due to reshuffling of dispatch and
changes in local pollutants.
Summing across market and non-market impacts, the benefits from CREZ conditional on
installed wind capacity are on the order of $800M/year. Critically, roughly 38% of the benefit
are due to non-market externalities. The Appendix shows that allowing non-linearity in the net
demand and supply curve impact the market and non-market TCL calculations. We find almost
identical losses so we conclude the linear approximation captures the important quantitative and
qualitative findings.
The cost of CREZ ERCOT ratepayers face is roughly between $7B according to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration.31 According to our estimates, then, the payback period
is roughly 8.75 years when accounting for non-market externalities. That payback period- in
addition to the stream of future gains- is more than adequate. Excluding the non-market benefits,
the payback period is 14 years. Given relatively low bonds rates over this period, this is not
completely unreasonable even completely ignoring CO2 mitigation for public projects. Certainly,
30See https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/downloads/2016-wind-technologies-market-report.
31See https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=16831 although other outlets report as high as $8B.
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though, a payback period on the order of nine years makes this transmission expansion a good
investment from a social welfare perspective.
2.6.3 Incidence of CREZ
While the price gap and transmission gap might have decreased between the West and
other zones due to CREZ, in order to calculate the incidence of CREZ we must determine
price increases in the west attributable to CREZ and price decreases in other parts of ERCOT
attributable to CREZ. The beneficiaries of CREZ are wholesale ratepayers in load centers (e.g.,
the demand side of the market) and bidders into the electricity market in the West during windy
hours (e.g., windfarms). This analysis focuses on wholesale electricity market price impacts in
the North, South, and Houston ERCOT zones and discusses the incidence of those impacts.
We denote price gap before CREZ project as η0 and that after the project as η1. Disag-
gregated further, denote the price difference for people in the population center and the West
before and after the CREZ project as ηB0 , η
A
0 , η
B
1 and η
A
1 respectively (using B superscripts for
load centers and A for the exporting zone west Texas in line with the theoretical model). From
the theoretical model, we can calculate them as:
4ηB0 = γ4K =
γη0
(β+ γ)
(2.14)
4ηA0 = β4K =
βη0
(β+ γ)
(2.15)
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4ηB1 = γ4K =
γη1
(β+ γ)
(2.16)
4ηA1 = β4K =
βη1
(β+ γ)
(2.17)
Noting that a negative number indicates spending decreases, the spending change for
market participants in load centers (again denoted with the B superscript in line with the theoretical
model) and market participants in the West (again denoted with the A superscript in line with the
theoretical model) is:
4SpendB = (4ηB1 −4ηB0 )×LB =
γ(η1−η0)
(β+ γ)
×LB = γ4η
(β+ γ)
×LB (2.18)
4SpendA = (4ηA1 −4ηA0 )×LA =
β(η1−η0)
(β+ γ)
×LA = β4η
(β+ γ)
×LA (2.19)
where LB and LA are average load in population center and the West respectively. 4η is
the impact of CREZ on price gap estimated by Equation (2.8). The the total spending change for
all people is given by:
4Spend =4SpendB+4SpendA (2.20)
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Table 2.6: Incidence Analysis of CREZ Project
Real Time Day Ahead
South North Houston South North Houston
Net Supply Slope ($/MWh per GWh) 3.637 4.8173 3.5317 1.9856 2.4383 1.6002
Net Demand Slope ($/MWh per GWh) -0.0067 -0.8065 -0.1845 -0.756 -0.543 -1.1681
Load West (GWh) 2.6228 2.6228 2.6228 2.6228 2.6228 2.6228
Price Change West ($/MWh) 5.8537 5.316 5.2378 3.3676 4.3783 2.4982
Spending Change West ($/h) 15353 13943 13738 8833 11483 6552
Average Spending Change West ($/h) 14345 8956
Load Pop Center (GWh) 9.534 12.9072 11.0282 9.534 12.9072 11.0282
Price Change Pop Center ($/MWh) -0.0108 -0.89 -0.2736 -1.2822 -0.975 -1.8237
Spending Change Pop Center ($/h) -103 -11487 -3017 -12224 -12585 -20112
Total Spending Change Pop Center ($/h) -14607 -44921
Net Spending Change ($/h) -262 -35965
Table 2.6 report the results for all the three pairs of regions using a back of the envelope
calculation which only looks at market averages. Using this simple calculation, the annual saving
outside of the west in the day ahead market ranges from $12,224/hour to $20,112/hour. Since
prices in West ERCOT increase, there is a price increase in West ERCOT on average. We can
take this number and then aggregate up to the annual level. West is calculated repeatedly so we
use an average for the West when we calculate the total spending saving in the whole ERCOT.
The total spending change per hour across ERCOT is -$315M in terms of lower wholesale rates.
This is an intuitive finding: the increased transmission of wind generation to greater ERCOT
means more zero marginal cost electricity supplied to the market.
The $315M calculation masks the fact that ratepayers will be passed through the cost
of CREZ construction. ERCOT market participants had to pay for CREZ through market
participation fees. This ultimately impacts rate payers. Thus the TCL sums calculated in the
paper, rather than incidence of changes in wholesale market prices, are the appropriate metrics
for calculating the benefits from lower TLCs attributable to CREZ.
However, while ratepayers and windfarms gained from hourly wholesale electricity prices,
generators not in the west are harmed by lower prices. Benefits to ratepayers and windfarms
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in the west are costs to generators not in the west (in addition to ratepayers in the west). Thus
CREZ led to a very large negative impact on non-west generators. To this end, 4,000 MWs of
coal capacity was recently approved from retirement.32 However, this is a joint function of lower
natural gas prices and increased wind capacity (Fell and Kaffine (2018)). We don’t make the
claim that CREZ caused these closures but to a first order approximation CREZ does not appear
to be a good thing for non-west ERCOT generators.
As with any paper, there are some drawbacks to our approach. First, while we allow for
non-linearities in the net supply and net demand curve and found mild non-linearities in the net
supply curve, further identification of precisely how the non-linearity arises could be important
for understanding trading in the wholesale electricity market broadly. Second, we have no theory
explaining differing results between the real time and day ahead markets. Third, we don’t perform
a cost benefit analysis of how the additional costs of transmission lines relate to the economic
gains from additional trade enabled by them. Fourth, transmission line loss is one factor that will
result in price discrepancy that we have not accounted for explicitly. More transmission lines
imply more line loss, but we observe little wind generation induced price gaps post CREZ so for
our sample period and our study, line loss is a second order impact. Fifth, we haven’t accounted
explicitly for plant start up costs which are important for coal fired generation (Reguant (2014)).
We view the interaction of wind generation and the value of quick dispatchable electricity to
be its own important economic question. Sixth, our results highlight how implementing yet
to be identified better mechanisms to resolve federal versus regional discrepancies in energy,
environmental and transmission policy making could lead to higher welfare.
32See goo.gl/X6vLCB/.
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2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper extends the electricity transmission framework from Joskow and Tirole (2005)
to characterize how policy encouraging intermittent renewable investment can interact with extant
transmission grid constraints to create transmission constraint loss. Consistent with the model,
we find evidence in ERCOT that increased wind generation of windfarms decreases wholesale
electricity prices at market settlement points near windfarms. Consistent with transmission
constraints which prevent trade of low cost electricity regions to high cost regions, increased wind
generation also creates a wedge between wholesale electricity prices near windfarms relative to
nearby nodes, such as population centers. A large expansion in transmission capacity decreased
the price wedge caused by wind generation between generation and load centers. The benefit
cost analysis for the project ride very much on the value of mitigated carbon for our analysis.
Based purely on market gains through more trade the payback period is roughly 14 years while
including non-market CO2 reductions the payback period falls to less than 9 years.
The principle policy implication of these findings are for complementary policies which
encourage new renewable capacity. One feature of wind subsidies in the US is that relative to
other policies, Production Tax Credits can exacerbate transmission constraints. PTCs encourage
locating windfarms in areas with high capacity factors instead of locations with a high wholesale
price of electricity. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate, an investment tax
credit (ITC) might preserve marginal incentives compared to a PTC since the PTC encourages
investment in higher volume locations, regardless of price, on the margin.33
The major contribution of this analysis is for transmission capacity expansion. While
there was no federal subsidy for transmission construction as part of the PTC, we show that
33In the Appendix, we sketch a theoretical model which shows the comparative decrease in incentives to invest near
high wholesale price areas due to the PTC and the ITC. Combined with the findings here, there is some evidence that
policy makers should evaluate the merits of policies which don’t have this incentive or the merits of complementary
policies encouraging either transmission grid construction or storage technology. We don’t claim that PTCs are
always the least desirable second best policies for renewables but rather highlight a cost of this policy which hasn’t
yet received adequate attention in either the economics literature nor from policy makers.
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ERCOT made investments to facilitate the increased level of electricity trade and increase overall
welfare. As a result, ERCOT’s current wholesale electricity market outcomes are a function
of both its electricity generation portfolio (including wind capacity receiving PTC payments)
and transmission investments from CREZ. Compared to a counterfactual world in which case
there was no PTC and no CREZ, is ERCOT better off? The PTC is funded at the national level
but ERCOT farms receive annual subsidies of roughly $600M/year or 12% of the PTC.34 This
$600M/year is a transfer from federal taxpayers to windfarm developers. If those developers live
in ERCOT then citizens living in ERCOT are no better or worse off when considering the PTC
except insofar as they benefit from receiving a disproportionate amount of the PTC. According
to the Census, Texas’ population is roughly 28M people or 8.7% of the population.35 However,
windfarm developers and their financing partners receive a very large benefit: the CREZ combined
with the PTC served to both subsidize windfarm development and then increases the revenue
received by the windfarms. Reduced wholesale electricity prices in ERCOT induced by CREZ
are both transfers from electricity producers in ERCOT to citizens. However, the cost of CREZ
expansion is passed through to ratepayers in ERCOT leading to increased costs overall. Thus, the
true welfare gains of CREZ conditional on the PTC depend on the impacts of local air pollutants
and non-local air pollutants. Finally, since there are also non-market benefits to global citizens
(reduced CO2), those global benefits must be internalized by regional decision makers for efficient
global policies. These complexities highlight the challenge efficient policy given the current
mechanism for investing in transmission capacity in the U.S.
Lastly, increased renewable penetration combined with low natural gas prices in the
electricity sector is driving down prices in wholesale electricity markets and decreasing fossil
fuel and nuclear generators viability to service debt. The question of revenue adequacy, capacity
markets and “missing money” in which market signals (e.g., price caps, unpriced option value of
generation capcity, etc.) don’t provide sufficient incentives for the grid is back at the forefront of
34See goo.gl/T3y8mu.
35See https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/TX.
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electricity policy circles (Joskow and Tirole (2007), Joskow (2008), Joskow (2013), and Cramton,
Ockenfels, and Stoft (2013)). We hope this paper highlights how developing a functional market
solution to ensure low cost and reliable electricity should account for efficient investment in the
transmission system.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 2.15 36 shows the increasing trend of total wind capacity in the United States.
We can see that wind capacity has increased dramatically since 2007. Figure 2.16 shows wind
capacity distribution across the United States by state by the second quarter of 2015. Among all
the states, Texas has the largest wind capacity, much more than California that follows.
36Source: https://cleantechnica.com/2015/08/06/us-installs-record-wind-capacity-q215-texas-reigns-supreme.
Same for Figure 2.16.
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Table 2.7: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Real Time Price Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South RT North RT North RT Houston RT Houston RT
Net Supply (West) 3.458*** 4.116*** 3.526*** 4.017*** 3.588*** 4.072***
(0.237) (0.393) (0.193) (0.341) (0.218) (0.389)
Net Demand (South) 1.658 0.309
(1.327) (0.618)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -3.298*** -3.937*** -3.456*** -3.964*** -3.183*** -3.707***
(0.261) (0.426) (0.206) (0.361) (0.284) (0.451)
Net Demand (South)*Percent -1.765 -0.231
(1.410) (0.740)
Net Demand (North) 0.115 0.529
(0.161) (0.422)
Net Demand (North)*Percent -0.0994 -0.442
(0.174) (0.463)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.271 -0.536
(0.433) (0.724)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent 0.742 0.731
(0.529) (1.091)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.098 0.260 0.173 0.352 0.068 0.198
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.8: Impacts of CREZ on Price Gap: Cluster By Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South DA North RT North DA Houston RT Houston DA
Percent Completion -5.864*** -4.650*** -6.206*** -5.353*** -5.511*** -4.322***
(0.812) (0.618) (0.678) (0.513) (0.854) (0.610)
Net Supply (West) 0.817*** 0.535*** 0.779*** 0.491*** 0.960*** 0.575***
(0.0769) (0.0470) (0.0721) (0.0461) (0.0963) (0.0487)
Net Demand (South) 0.105 -0.00994
(0.0866) (0.0485)
Net Demand (North) 0.0180 -0.0329
(0.0379) (0.0300)
Net Demand (Houston) 0.247** 0.136**
(0.0981) (0.0605)
Constant 3.492*** 3.975*** 4.251*** 4.578*** 1.774 2.492***
(0.917) (0.590) (0.798) (0.529) (1.249) (0.688)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.022 0.107 0.056 0.193 0.013 0.111
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Real Time Price Gap: Cluster By Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South RT North RT North RT Houston RT Houston RT
Net Supply (West) 3.458*** 4.116*** 3.526*** 4.017*** 3.588*** 4.072***
(0.320) (0.506) (0.296) (0.453) (0.311) (0.503)
Net Demand (South) 1.658 0.309
(1.226) (0.681)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -3.298*** -3.937*** -3.456*** -3.964*** -3.183*** -3.707***
(0.344) (0.541) (0.314) (0.480) (0.363) (0.563)
Net Demand (South)*Percent -1.765 -0.231
(1.303) (0.804)
Net Demand (North) 0.115 0.529
(0.160) (0.477)
Net Demand (North)*Percent -0.0994 -0.442
(0.175) (0.525)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.271 -0.536
(0.425) (0.665)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent 0.742 0.731
(0.530) (1.046)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.098 0.260 0.173 0.352 0.068 0.198
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.10: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Day Ahead Price Gap: Cluster By Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South DA South DA North DA North DA Houston DA Houston DA
Net Supply (West) 2.066*** 1.662*** 2.154*** 1.665*** 2.200*** 1.725***
(0.160) (0.136) (0.168) (0.132) (0.170) (0.134)
Net Demand (South) -0.0923 0.000750
(0.220) (0.201)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -1.980*** -1.625*** -2.158*** -1.662*** -2.044*** -1.662***
(0.170) (0.145) (0.178) (0.140) (0.181) (0.147)
Net Demand (South)*Percent 0.0582 0.0958
(0.250) (0.227)
Net Demand (North) -0.0984 0.00351
(0.0887) (0.115)
Net Demand (North)*Percent 0.110 0.0584
(0.0962) (0.127)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.396 -0.260
(0.244) (0.173)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent 0.669** 0.609***
(0.282) (0.228)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.415 0.652 0.526 0.784 0.470 0.710
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Impacts of CREZ on Price Gap: Trim Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South DA North RT North DA Houston RT Houston DA
Percent Completion -8.333*** -6.739*** -8.095*** -7.151*** -8.203*** -6.317***
(1.221) (0.497) (0.684) (0.427) (1.229) (0.503)
Net Supply (West) 1.777*** 1.235*** 1.782*** 1.167*** 1.825*** 1.258***
(0.114) (0.0605) (0.0935) (0.0564) (0.131) (0.0587)
Net Demand (South) 0.176 -0.111**
(0.126) (0.0484)
Net Demand (North) 0.0820* -0.0143
(0.0457) (0.0257)
Net Demand (Houston) 0.152** -0.0421
(0.0736) (0.0401)
Constant 2.609** 4.849*** 2.959*** 4.197*** 2.743** 4.311***
(1.195) (0.450) (0.871) (0.399) (1.131) (0.478)
Observations 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460
R-squared 0.037 0.174 0.084 0.255 0.029 0.203
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.12: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Real Time Price Gap: Trim Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South RT North RT North RT Houston RT Houston RT
Net Supply (West) 3.828*** 4.228*** 3.915*** 4.369*** 3.970*** 4.430***
(0.277) (0.448) (0.220) (0.382) (0.247) (0.430)
Net Demand (South) 2.064 0.229
(1.371) (0.721)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -4.316*** -4.266*** -4.525*** -4.944*** -4.199*** -4.730***
(0.433) (0.653) (0.301) (0.490) (0.408) (0.582)
Net Demand (South)*Percent -3.084* 0.0651
(1.645) (1.202)
Net Demand (North) 0.243 0.760
(0.169) (0.479)
Net Demand (North)*Percent -0.498** -1.118*
(0.215) (0.646)
Net Demand (Houston) 0.193 -0.924
(0.448) (0.814)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent -0.789 2.034
(0.677) (1.251)
Observations 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460
R-squared 0.106 0.270 0.171 0.347 0.089 0.213
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.13: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Day Ahead Price Gap: Trim Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South DA South DA North DA North DA Houston DA Houston DA
Net Supply (West) 2.269*** 1.750*** 2.429*** 1.805*** 2.398*** 1.851***
(0.136) (0.116) (0.117) (0.104) (0.123) (0.109)
Net Demand (South) 0.172 0.105
(0.458) (0.224)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -2.534*** -1.869*** -2.919*** -2.051*** -2.576*** -2.021***
(0.184) (0.161) (0.158) (0.130) (0.179) (0.150)
Net Demand (South)*Percent -0.805 -0.193
(0.527) (0.303)
Net Demand (North) -0.00296 0.0264
(0.0840) (0.141)
Net Demand (North)*Percent -0.189* -0.00680
(0.109) (0.184)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.119 -0.138
(0.187) (0.199)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent -0.249 0.297
(0.266) (0.301)
Observations 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460
R-squared 0.417 0.653 0.513 0.778 0.469 0.723
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.14: Impacts of CREZ on Price Gap: Control For All Load
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South DA North RT North DA Houston RT Houston DA
Percent Completion -6.097*** -4.926*** -6.261*** -5.380*** -6.188*** -4.765***
(0.566) (0.321) (0.468) (0.295) (0.642) (0.314)
Net Supply (West) 0.772*** 0.499*** 0.774*** 0.488*** 0.883*** 0.522***
(0.0516) (0.0250) (0.0407) (0.0240) (0.0789) (0.0253)
Net Demand (South) 1.362** 0.620*** 0.426*** 0.433*** -0.139 0.169
(0.610) (0.195) (0.145) (0.0816) (0.338) (0.153)
Net Demand (North) -0.754*** -0.524*** -0.169** -0.202*** -0.680*** -0.544***
(0.117) (0.0543) (0.0766) (0.0434) (0.132) (0.0549)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.250 0.0705 -0.140 -0.175*** 1.203*** 0.645***
(0.509) (0.154) (0.0972) (0.0539) (0.312) (0.120)
Constant 4.232*** 4.197*** 4.195*** 4.588*** 1.909* 2.683***
(0.803) (0.373) (0.636) (0.326) (1.054) (0.389)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.025 0.120 0.057 0.196 0.015 0.133
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.15: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Real Time Price Gap: Control For All
Load
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South RT South RT North RT North RT Houston RT Houston RT
Net Supply (West) 3.521*** 4.130*** 3.547*** 4.017*** 3.588*** 4.086***
(0.218) (0.394) (0.195) (0.342) (0.217) (0.391)
Net Demand (South) 4.572 1.233 -0.0258 -0.215 -0.235 0.705
(3.293) (1.324) (0.603) (0.940) (0.816) (1.501)
Net Demand (North) -0.121 0.212 0.370 0.707 0.207 0.424
(0.408) (0.597) (0.289) (0.454) (0.383) (0.735)
Net Demand (Houston) -3.179 -1.426 -0.547 -0.181 -0.328 -1.424
(2.104) (1.065) (0.510) (0.853) (0.700) (1.099)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -3.402*** -3.968*** -3.476*** -3.965*** -3.234*** -3.728***
(0.240) (0.427) (0.208) (0.362) (0.281) (0.453)
Net Demand (South)*Percent -4.528 -0.704 -0.0386 0.408 -0.0409 -1.605
(3.565) (1.512) (0.659) (1.017) (0.967) (1.824)
Net Demand (North)*Percent -0.653 -0.822 -0.324 -0.709 -0.936* -0.432
(0.512) (0.724) (0.322) (0.504) (0.523) (0.909)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent 4.209* 1.683 0.537 0.168 1.910** 2.266
(2.304) (1.223) (0.548) (0.932) (0.863) (1.414)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.101 0.261 0.173 0.352 0.069 0.198
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
2.9.2 Production Tax Credits and Location Incentives
Consider how a production tax credit (PTC) can interact with congestion constraints
described in the theoretical model above and lead to decreased incentives to invest in high value
areas where electricity fetches a high price. The goal of this subsection is to show how a PTC
creates an incentive to invest in areas with high levels of wind generation, regardless of wholesale
electricity price, relative to other policies. We then describe how high initial PTC levels could
lead to investment in wind generation capacity even when severe congestion constraints exist.
This motivates the subsequent research design as it highlights how wind construction decisions
might be somewhat exogenous with respect to the precise timing of CREZ completion.
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Table 2.16: Impacts of CREZ and Wind Generation on Day Ahead Price Gap: Control For All
Load
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES South DA South DA North DA North DA Houston DA Houston DA
Net Supply (West) 2.061*** 1.664*** 2.163*** 1.667*** 2.172*** 1.728***
(0.114) (0.104) (0.103) (0.0947) (0.104) (0.0988)
Net Demand (South) 0.414 0.216 -0.432 0.182 -0.692 0.327
(1.090) (0.350) (0.276) (0.271) (0.719) (0.298)
Net Demand (North) -0.236 0.0624 0.168 0.0492 -0.146 0.0475
(0.168) (0.177) (0.132) (0.154) (0.150) (0.174)
Net Demand (Houston) -0.228 -0.358 -0.101 -0.321 0.355 -0.541**
(0.702) (0.317) (0.215) (0.220) (0.489) (0.261)
Net Supply (West)*Percent -1.990*** -1.629*** -2.167*** -1.664*** -2.031*** -1.667***
(0.121) (0.111) (0.108) (0.1000) (0.111) (0.108)
Net Demand (South)*Percent -0.559 -0.236 0.402 -0.175 0.598 -0.637*
(1.181) (0.390) (0.298) (0.292) (0.787) (0.338)
Net Demand (North)*Percent 0.0758 -0.137 -0.133 -0.000763 -0.0460 -0.00623
(0.189) (0.202) (0.145) (0.169) (0.177) (0.208)
Net Demand (Houston)*Percent 0.626 0.614* 0.0753 0.346 0.231 1.074***
(0.768) (0.359) (0.233) (0.238) (0.544) (0.305)
Observations 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575 52,575
R-squared 0.417 0.653 0.528 0.784 0.474 0.710
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.17: Identification of Net Supply and Net Demand Curves West and North DA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P(North) P(West) P(North) P(West) P(North) P(West)
P(Gap)> 1 P(Gap)> 1 P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 5 P(Gap)> 5
VARIABLES Year <= 2013 Year <= 2013 Year <= 2013 Year <= 2013 Year <= 2013 Year <= 2013
Net Demand (North) 0.477** 0.870*** 0.379 0.917*** 0.604** 1.027***
(0.241) (0.321) (0.240) (0.342) (0.269) (0.323)
Net Supply (West) -0.899*** -2.505*** -0.916*** -2.730*** -0.816*** -2.406***
(0.154) (0.202) (0.147) (0.225) (0.213) (0.310)
Observations 8,699 8,699 6,478 6,478 4,262 4,262
R-squared 0.725 0.743 0.918 0.893 0.934 0.894
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
As a first step, consider the equilibrium quantity of electricity trading if there were no
transmission constraints. This would mean prices in the exporting node A and importing Node B
equalize. This implicitly defines the unconstrained amount of traded electricity Q as a function of
wind generation and market characteristics:
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Table 2.18: Net Supply and Net Demand Curves North: Top 10% load hours trimmed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P(North) P(West) P(North) P(West) P(North) P(West)
VARIABLES P(Gap)> 1 P(Gap)> 1 P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 5 P(Gap)> 5
Net Demand (North) 0.464** 0.727*** 0.385* 0.801*** 0.291* 0.609**
(0.192) (0.256) (0.204) (0.286) (0.168) (0.309)
Net Supply (West) -0.787*** -2.228*** -0.781*** -2.465*** -0.828*** -2.404***
(0.145) (0.189) (0.183) (0.245) (0.216) (0.324)
Observations 9,698 9,698 6,903 6,903 4,173 4,173
R-squared 0.838 0.838 0.847 0.841 0.962 0.934
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
aB+bBLBt −bBQ∗ = aA+bA(LAt −Wt)+bAQ∗
Q∗(W ) =
aB−aA+bBLBt −bA(LAt −Wt)
bA+bB
(2.21)
This convenient expression lets us determine how the volume of traded electricity changes with
wind generation: ∂Q
∗
∂W =
bA
bA+bB
< 1. This is the familiar expression that the rate of change in Q
is a function of the relative slopes of the supply and demand curve when there are no capacity
constraints: Q∗ < K. Alternatively, if there are capacity constraints, the total change in traded
quantity is zero, by definition: ∂Q
∗
∂W = 0 if Q
∗ ≥ K.
Plugging in equilibrium Q∗ in the price equation for node A provides insights on how
additional wind generation would impact equilibrium price in node A (e.g., the wind generation
hub) with and without capacity constraints. Specifically, if Q∗ < K then ∂P
∗
A
∂W = bA(
bA
bA+bB
−1)< 0.
Note that −1 < ( bAbA+bB −1)< 0. Alternatively, if Q∗ ≥ K then
∂P∗A
∂W =−bA. As a result, we have
the simple result that in equilibrium, abs(∂P
∗
A
∂W )|Q∗ < K|< abs(
∂P∗A
∂W )|Q∗ ≥ K, where abs() is the
absolute value operator. In words, this means that the price impact on increased wind generation
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in the exporting region is larger (e.g., more negative) if there are capacity constraints. At a high
level, the barrier to trade due to transmission constraints harms wind generators in node A relative
to when there is no transmission constraint.
Now consider the firms investment decision with and without a PTC subsidy. In this
simple model, we ignore investment costs to focus solely on how different subsidy schemes
interact with transmission constraints. Note that W is the quantity of wind generation sold,
hence P∗W is revenue to a representative wind farm in node A. In equilibrium, total revenue for
wind farms is TR= P(Q(W ))∗W in the absence of a PTC and TR= (P(Q(W ))+ s)∗W with a
production tax credit of s.
One way to see the interaction of the PTC with capacity constraints is to evaluate the
marginal impact of wind generation on total revenue to the total revenue of a wind farm in the
presence of capacity constraints both with and without the PTC. We can then compare the PTC to
other policy instruments. For example, consider a subsidy on the wholesale price of electricity,
τ> 0: TR= P(Q(W ))∗ (1+τ)∗W . The marginal revenue to a wind farm for a marginal increase
in wind generation when Q∗t > K is:
w/ PTC
∂TR
∂W
=
∂P∗(W )
∂W
W +P∗(W )+ s
= −bAW +P∗(W )+ s (2.22)
w/ price subsidy :
∂TR
∂W
=
∂P∗(W )
∂W
(1+ τ)W +P∗(W )(1+ τ)
= −bAW (1+ τ)+P∗(W )(1+ τ) (2.23)
The first first term in both equations (2.22) and (2.23) is the indirect price impact of additional
wind generation and the second term is the quantity impact. Because τ> 0 the price decrease of
additional wind is internalized more with a price instrument (τ) relative to a quantity instrument
with the PTC (s) conditional on W : −bAW (1+ τ)<−bAW . The quantity impact of the policy
instrument (e.g., the second terms) are not directly comparable. More importantly, there is no
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interaction of the PTC and market signals to windfarms: ∂
2TR
∂W∂s = 1. For a price based subsidy,
there is an interaction: ∂
2TR
∂W∂τ = −bAW +P∗(W ). Note that an investment tax credit would not
impact marginal incentives whatsoever since there is no impact price nor quantity interaction
from a cost based policy.37
In sum, this framework shows that with transmission constraints, there is no feedback link
between the policy instrument and price. Intuitively, a PTC creates an incentive to invest in areas
with high levels of wind generation, regardless of price. A price subsidy or investment tax credit
leverages, or at least preserves, price signals to the investor. As a result, we would expect the
nature of a PTC to impact the location of wind farms on the margin to areas with high levels of
wind generation, even in the presence of transmission constraints.
2.9.3 Net Supply and Demand Non-linearities and TCLs
Introducing non-linearity into the net supply and net demand models requires care in
augmenting equations (2.12) and (2.13) used to estimate the net supply and net demand slope
parameters. Adding polynomials in net supply/demand is not feasible because we need to
perform functions on the slope coefficients to subsequently calculate the transmission capacity
gap. Polynomials don’t easily allow that because the slope is a function of the net supply/demand
levels which are themselves changing over time.
We perform the following procedure to allow for non-linearity: first we trim the sample
to include the sample we use to estimate equations (2.12) and (2.13) (e.g., only hours where we
observe a price gap of $2/MWh or more). Second, we create a dummy variable equal to one
when the price gap is above the median price gap in the sample. Third, we interact that indicator
variable with net supply and net demand, to test for a change in the net supply and net demand
elasticities for large or small level of net demand or net supply:
37In particular if TR= P(Q(W ))∗W + t then ∂2TR∂W∂t = 0.
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pAt = α+β(Wt−LAt )+βh1{Wt−LAt ≥ P50|η>$2}∗ (Wt−LAt )+ γ2LBt +δhmy+λd+ εt (2.24)
pBt = α+β2(Wt−LAt )+βh21{Wt−LAt ≥ P50|η>$2}∗ (Wt−LAt )+ γLBt +δhmy+λd+ εt (2.25)
The coefficients of interest in these regressions are βh and βh2 respectively. A estimated
coefficient which is significantly different from zero means elasticities change for net supply gaps
above the median conditional on price differences great than $2/MWh.
Table 2.19: Identification Slopes North DA: Nonlinear Checks
(1) (2)
P(North) P(West)
VARIABLES P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 2
Net Demand (North) 0.630** 1.012***
(0.268) (0.333)
Net Supply (West) -0.767*** -2.121***
(0.192) (0.364)
1(Net Demand Above Median)*Net Demand -0.0356
(0.0317)
1(Net Supply Above Median)*Net Supply -0.304*
(0.180)
Observations 7,326 7,326
R-squared 0.861 0.856
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES
Sample Day FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
122
Table 2.20: Identification Slopes South DA: Nonlinear Checks
(1) (2)
P(South) P(West)
VARIABLES P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 2
Net Demand (South) 0.619 1.071
(0.743) (0.653)
Net Supply (West) -0.940*** -1.643***
(0.228) (0.388)
1(Net Demand Above Median)*Net Demand 0.0547
(0.0878)
1(Net Supply Above Median)*Net Supply -0.352
(0.240)
Observations 10,895 10,895
R-squared 0.806 0.810
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES
Sample Day FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
The Tables show the results of the regressions for day-ahead elasticities for the North,
South and Houston all relative to the West. The general result is that there doesn’t appear to be
any strong evidence of non-linearity in the net demand nor net supply curves with non-linearity
defined in this way. Only between the West and the North is there mild evidence of a non-linearity
increasing net supply elasticity for high levels of net supply: -.304 versus -2.121 or a 14% increase
significant at the 10% level.
Focusing on the West to North relationship we use the estimated non-linear net supply
and net demand slope coefficients to construct transmission shortfalls. By inspection, the findings
are very similar to the linear counterparts shown in them main text. Figure 2.24 shows the
same flattening over time. Figures 2.25 shows TCLs for market impacts and Figure 2.26 shows
TCLs for non-market impacts using the non-linear results for each region. We again observe no
qualitative nor quantitative difference between these findings and those from the main text.
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Table 2.21: Identification Slopes Houston DA: Nonlinear Checks
(1) (2)
P(Houston) P(West)
VARIABLES P(Gap)> 2 P(Gap)> 2
Net Demand (Houston) 1.199*** 1.061***
(0.363) (0.349)
Net Supply (West) -0.592*** -1.459***
(0.166) (0.345)
1(Net Demand Above Median)*Net Demand -0.0132
(0.0497)
1(Net Supply Above Median)*Net Supply -0.143
(0.226)
Observations 12,689 12,689
R-squared 0.838 0.839
Year-Month-Hour FE YES YES
Sample Day FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered by sample day are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 2.3: CREZ lines locations, wind capacity and urban centers in ERCOT
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Figure 2.4: FERC Electric Power Markets
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Figure 2.5: Wind Capacity in ERCOT by Month
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Figure 2.6: Load Zones in ERCOT. The color of the circles indicates capacity levels of the wind
farms (red having more capacity and green less).
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Figure 2.7: Wind Farms in ERCOT (Texas)
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Figure 2.8: Average Day Ahead Electricity Prices by Wind Generation Levels
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Figure 2.9: Effects of Wind Generation on Day Ahead Prices in ERCOT
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Figure 2.10: Price Gap By Year
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Figure 2.11: Effects of Net Supply on Price Gap By Year
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Figure 2.12: Net Demand Shock
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Figure 2.13: Implied transmissions shortfall by year.
135
Figure 2.14: Yearly sum transmission constraint losses for all regions.
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Figure 2.15: Wind Capacity by Year
137
Figure 2.16: Wind Capacity by State by Q2 2015
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Figure 2.17: Effects of Wind Generation on Real Time Prices in ERCOT
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Figure 2.18: Implied transmissions shortfall by year: West-South DA.
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Figure 2.19: Implied transmissions shortfall by year: West-Houston DA.
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Figure 2.20: Implied transmissions shortfall by year: West-North RT.
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Figure 2.21: Implied transmissions shortfall by year: West-South RT.
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Figure 2.22: Implied transmissions shortfall by year: West-Houston RT.
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Figure 2.23: Yearly sum transmission constraint losses for all regions RT.
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Figure 2.24: Implied transmissions shortfall by year with Non-linear model: West-North DA.
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Figure 2.25: Market TCL for ERCOT with non-linear DA model
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Figure 2.26: Non-market TCL for ERCOT with non-linear DA model
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Chapter 3
Temperature, Avoidance Behavior and
Risk Taking
3.1 Introduction
Climate change has become one of the most critical problems around the world and has
been shown to affect various aspects of the economy.1 An extensive and growing literature
focuses on adverse impacts of climate change and extreme temperature on a wide range of
individual and social outcomes. These studies show that extreme temperature affects people’s
health (e.g. Bosello et al., 2005; Kjellstrom et al., 2009; Deschenes and Greenstone, 2011;
Burgess et al., 2017), cognitive performance (e.g. Seppanen et al., 2006; Hancock et al., 2007),
labor productivity and employment (e.g. Niemela, 2002; Kjellstrom et al., 2009; Somanathan et
al., 2014; Zander et al., 2015; Colmer, 2017; Park, 2017), production, trade and economic growth
(e.g. Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; Hsiang, 2010; Jones and Olken, 2010; Dell et al., 2012),
and so on. An emerging literature also looks at the effects of weather on emotion, crime and
1According to World Economic Forum’s Global Shapers Survey 2017, climate change was chosen to be the most
serious issue affecting the world for the third year in a row. Nearly half (48.8%) of the survey participants chose
climate change as their top concern.
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stock returns (e.g. Cao and Wei, 2015; Horrocks and Menclova, 2011; Ranson, 2014; Carleton,
2017; Baylis et al, 2018). However, little has been studied on people’s behavior of risk taking in
response to climate or temperature changes.
This paper provides the first evidence of the impacts of temperature on people’s risk
taking in a natural experimental setting. There are two possible channels through which extreme
temperature could influence risk taking: A physiological one, through which extreme weather
directly affects the central nervous system and causes discomfort which leads to change in risk
taking; and a behavioral one, through which people have more concern about their future health
when observing extreme weather, which changes their behavior of risk taking.2
In this paper, I investigate the impact of temperature on risk taking by leveraging daily
temperature variation with sales of a ”risky” good—multi-state Powerball tickets. I take advantage
of daily variation of temperature and daily sales of Powerball tickets to identify this effect.
Powerball sales can serve as a good measure of instant risk taking in my setting because it is a
decision likely affected by daily variation of temperature changes. I collect daily Powerball sales
for Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, Texas and Washington
from their state lottery offices and aggregate the data to the county level. The weather data come
from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I match county centroid with
monitoring stations within 100 kilometers with inverse distance weighting. By controlling for
state by time fixed effects and county fixed effects, I explore the daily variation of temperature
changes within counties, which can be taken as good as random.
However, people also show avoidance behavior towards bad weather conditions (e.g.
Thorsson et al, 2007; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014). Since Powerball tickets are sold in retail
stores, mainly grocery and convenient stores, people have to go out to buy them.3 Therefore, the
impacts of temperature on the Powerball sales include two parts: impacts of avoidance behavior
2In this paper, I will not distinguish between channels, but it is planned as future work.
3Only Georgia and Illinois have Powerball tickets available online during my data period, but they are not
included in my data. So all Powerball tickets were sold in retail stores in the dataset.
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and impacts of risk taking. In order to rule out the impacts of avoidance behavior, I calculate
two measures: Powerball sales per trip and Powerball sales per dollar spent in retail stores. By
investigating the impacts of temperature on Powerball sales per trip or Powerball sales per dollar
spent, I compare purchases of the risky good with consumer’s regular trips to retail stores or
purchases of other risk neutral goods. This allows us to rule out the impacts of avoidance behavior.
I find that Powerball sales increase as temperature increases. In addition, people reduce
their trips to retail stores in both low and high temperature days, showing an inverted U-shape
curve of trips in terms of temperature. But the increase trend of Powerball sales preserves even
taking avoidance behavior into consideration. The results show that 1 Fahrenheit degree increase
leads to 0.1% increase in Powerball sales per trip (and per dollar spent in retail stores). It suggests
that people are more likely to take risk in high temperature days.
This paper adds to the knowledge of understanding individual’s behavior and complements
the literature by exploring a different aspect of the temperature impacts. Besides, this shows
suggestive evidence that risk taking can be a potential channel for more accident injuries and
crime in high temperature days. Furthermore, understanding people’s risk taking under extreme
temperature also helps making climate change policies.
This paper relates to the studies focusing on impacts of temperature or heat on risk taking
in experimental settings (e.g. Chang et al., 2017; Wang, 2017; Syndicus et al., 2018). My study
differs from theirs for the following reasons: First, my study includes observations from nearly
10 states for 11 years, which checks the external validity of the experimental results. Second,
my study allows more temperature options so that I can plot the risking taking behavior as a
function of temperature. My results are mostly consistent with the experimental outcomes, which
complements their studies in a more real and broad context.
The rest of the proposal is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces data. Section 3
discusses empirical strategy. Section 4 shows results and Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Data
3.2.1 Powerball Sales
Powerball is a multi-state lottery game offered by 44 states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It is coordinated by the Multi-State Lottery Association
(MUSL), a nonprofit organization formed by an agreement with U.S. lotteries. Figure 3.5 shows
the states that are covered and Table 1 shows when the states joined.
Each play costs $2, or $3 with the Power Play option.4 For the basic game, players select
five numbers from a set of 69 white balls and one number from 26 red Powerballs. The drawing
order of the five white balls is irrelevant and the red ball number can be the same as one of the
white balls. For the Power Play option, players can choose to pay an extra $1 per game to multiply
non-jackpot winnings by up to 5, or 10 when the jackpot is under $150 million. A wheel was
introduced to select the Power Play multiplier for each drawing.5 Drawings are held Wednesday
and Saturday evenings at 10:59 p.m. Eastern Time at the Florida Lotterys studio in Tallahassee.
By sending request to state lottery offices under Public Records Act, I collect daily
Powerball sales data for Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon,
Texas and Washington at various levels from their state lottery offices.6 The data are aggregated at
county level for year 2006-2016. Figure 3.1 shows the states and counties that data are available.
4Powerball plays initially cost $1. On January 15, 2012, the price of each basic Powerball play doubled to $2,
while PowerPlay games became $3.
5The second year since Power Play option was introduced, the 1x was removed from the Power Play wheel.
6The Act involves slightly different names for different states, for example, some states call it Free Information
Act. They provide data at different levels including store level, zip code level, city level, and county level. Since
different states joined the lottery at different time and their record history could be different for other reasons, the
period of the data for different states are different.
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Figure 3.1: Data Coverage
3.2.2 Weather
The weather data I use are from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA)’s Global Summary of the Day (GSOD), which contains maximum temperature, mean
temperature, mean dew point, mean sea level pressure, mean station pressure, mean visibility,
mean wind speed, maximum sustained wind speed, maximum wind gust, maximum temperature,
minimum temperature, precipitation amount and snow depth.7 Note that weather stations opened
and closed occasionally during the time period. To keep weather measurements consistent over
time, I only keep the stations that operate all through the data period.
In order to match weather data to Powerball sales data, I match each county’s centroid
7Temperature is in unit of 0.1 Fahrenheit, pressure is in unit of 0.1 mb, visibility is in unit of 0.1 miles, wind
speed is in unit of 0.1 knots, snow depth is in unit of 0.01 inches.
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with monitoring stations within 100 kilometers and assign inverse distance weighted weather to
the county.
3.2.3 Trips to Retail Stores
In order to take avoidance behavior into account, I also use the Nielsen Consumer Panel
Data which comprise a representative panel of households that continually provide information
about their trips and purchases. I aggregate their daily trips to retail stores at county level for
2006-2016 and merge it with the Powerball sales and weather data. Then, I construct Powerball
sales per trip and Powerball sales per dollar spent in retail stores as measures of risk taking given
people decide to go out.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
To study the impacts of temperature on Powerball sales, I estimate the following equation:
log(PB)ct = βPB0 +
N
∑
i=1
βPBi Binict+
N
∑
j=1
γPBj X jct+ηst+θc+ εct (3.1)
where log(PB)ct is the log of Powerball sales at county c at date t, Binict is a set of temperature
bins, X jct is a set of other weather variables, ηst is the state specific time fixed effects, θc is county
fixed effects, εct is error term.8 The baseline group is the 50-60 Fahrenheit degree temperature
bin. βPBi ’s are coefficients of interest, which are interpreted as the impacts of temperature in bin i
on Powerball sales compared to that of the baseline bin. I add state by month, state by year and
day of week fixed effects in my preferred specification. In robustness checks, I also relax the
state by month fixed effects to state by season and only state by year fixed effects to allow more
8I use the log form for two reasons: First, the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data only includes a representative sample
of households, while the Powerball sales are the universal numbers. Taking logs can automatically remove the level
mismatch. Second, it is easy to interpret and compare with other goods.
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variation in temperature.
However, as discussed above, people show avoidance behavior towards bad weather
conditions. To further rule out the impacts of avoidance behavior, I calculate two measures:
Powerball sales per trip and Powerball sales per dollar spent in retail stores, and estimate the
following equations:
log(PB/Trip)ct = β
PB/Trip
0 +
N
∑
i=1
βPB/Tripi Binict+
N
∑
j=1
γPB/Tripj X jct+ηst+θc+ εct (3.2)
log(PB/Spent)ct = β
PB/Spent
0 +
N
∑
i=1
βPB/Spenti Binict+
N
∑
j=1
γPB/Spentj X jct+ηst+θc+ εct (3.3)
where log(PB/Trip)ct is the log of Powerball sales per trip to retail stores at county c at date
t, log(PB/Spent)ct is the log of Powerball sales per dollar money spent on regular goods in retail
stores at county c at date t, all else are the same as above. βPB/Tripi ’s indicate the impacts of
temperature in bin i on Powerball sales per trip compared to that of the baseline bin. βPB/Spenti ’s
indicate the impacts of temperature in bin i on Powerball sales per dollar spent in retail stores
compared to that of the baseline bin.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main Results
Figure 3.2 shows the percentage change in Powerball sales as a function of daily maximum
temperature. I use maximum temperature as the main specification because this allows us to
better explore the higher end of the temperature impacts. In one of the robustness checks, I also
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consider daily average temperature. Figure 3.2 reveals that Powerball sales increase as maximum
temperature increases, except for the 90-100 Fahrenheit degree bin. But they increase slowly for
high temperatures. This may be due to avoidance behavior in both high and low temperatures.
Figure 3.3 confirms that people make fewer trips and purchases in extreme temperature from both
ends and shows an inverted U-shape curve. Furthermore, Figure 3.4 suggests that Powerball sales
per trip (and per dollar spent in retail stores) increase almost linearly in maximum temperature.
Figure 3.2: Percentage Change in Powerball Sales and Maximum Temperature
Table 3.1 reports the linear impacts. Column (1) shows the impact on percentage change
in Powerball sales per trip, Column (2) shows the impact on percentage change in Powerball sales
per dollar spent in retail stores, Column (3) shows the impact on percentage change in Powerball
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Figure 3.3: Percentage Change in Trips to Retail Stores and Maximum Temperature
sales.9 The impacts on both percentage change in Powerball sales per trip and per dollar spent are
about 0.1%. The elasticity of Jackpot size is approximately 0.4, which is relatively inelastic.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
I conduct several robustness checks and placebo tests. First, I use daily average tempera-
ture instead of maximum temperature. Table 3.3 shows that the results are similar but slightly
larger. Second, I control for different levels of time fixed effects. In the main specification, I
control for state by month fixed effects. For robustness checks, I include state by year or state by
season fixed effects and Table 3.4 suggests the results are robust. Third, I only count trips to the
types of stores that sell Powerball, including grocery stores, convenient stores, and drug stores
like CVS. Figure 3.6 shows that the curve still preserve inverted U-shape but slightly less volatile
on the cold end. Table 3.5 shows consistent but slightly larger impacts. Fourth, I add lags for
Jackpot size and temperature and Table 3.6 shows slightly smaller impacts of current temperature.
9According to Figure 3.2, the impact on percentage change in Powerball sales is actually nonlinear. The third
column is just for comparison purpose.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage Change in Powerball Sales per Trip and Maximum Temperature
Finally, I conduct placobo tests on other goods. Figure 3.7 shows that cookie sales present similar
inverted U-shape trend in temperature to trips to retail stores. Table 3.7 report results for cookie,
coffee, cereal and hand soap, which are considered to be relatively risk neutral and they show
almost no impacts of temperature. Tobacco products instead, can be thought of another set of
risky goods, so they show similar impacts to Powerball sales. This further confirms that people
are more likely to take risk for high temperatures.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides the first evidence on the impacts of temperature on people’s risk
taking in a natural experimental setting. Take advantage of daily variation of temperature and daily
sales of Powerball tickets, I find that sales of Powerball as a risky good, increase as temperature
increases. To further deal with avoidance behavior, I find an inverted U-shape curve of trips to
retail stores as a function of temperature. And 1 Fahrenheit degree increase in temperature leads
to 0.1% increase in Powerball sales per trip (and per dollar spent in retail stores), which suggests
that people are more likely to take risk in high temperature. The findings complements current
158
Table 3.1: Main Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(PB/trip) log(PB/spent) log(PB)
log(Jackpot) 0.427*** 0.427*** 0.425***
(0.00443) (0.00452) (0.00371)
Maximum Temperature 0.000946*** 0.00105*** 0.00166***
(0.000115) (0.000150) (8.14e-05)
Visibility 0.00113 0.000353 0.00599***
(0.00146) (0.00187) (0.00108)
Wind Speed -0.00256*** -0.00238*** -0.00394***
(0.000335) (0.000436) (0.000221)
Rain -0.00267 -0.000199 -0.0134***
(0.00332) (0.00492) (0.00186)
Snow 0.00121 0.00100 -0.00312***
(0.00103) (0.00135) (0.00113)
Observations 843,097 843,028 1,417,922
R-squared 0.715 0.532 0.953
Within R-squared 0.16 0.075 0.321
County FEs YES YES YES
Year by State FEs YES YES YES
Month by State YES YES YES
DOW FFs YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
literature in exploring potential impacts of extreme temperature and climate change, which helps
make polices regarding climate change and risk taking.
There are still problems that are not solved in this paper which I plan for my future work.
First, I do not distinguish between physiological and behavior channels. Second, I could match
county level geographical and demographical variables to see how people with different income
and education levels behave differently. Besides, comparing counties (states) with regular high
temperature and low temperature, I can also see whether people adapt and adjust their risk taking
behavior.
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3.6 Appendix
Figure 3.5: States that have joined Powerball
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Table 3.2: The Dates States Joined Powerball
State Date joined State Date joined
Arizona April 4, 1994 New Hampshire November 5, 1995
Arkansas October 31, 2009 New Jersey January 31, 2010
California April 8, 2013 New Mexico October 20, 1996
Connecticut November 28, 1995 New York January 31, 2010
Colorado August 2, 2001 North Carolina May 30, 2006
Delaware January 14, 1991 North Dakota March 25, 2004
District of Columbia February 13, 1988 Ohio April 16, 2010
Florida January 4, 2009 Oklahoma January 12, 2006
Georgia January 31, 2010 Oregon February 13, 1988
Idaho February 1, 1990 Pennsylvania June 29, 2002
Illinois January 31, 2010 Puerto Rico September 28, 2014
Indiana October 14, 1990 Rhode Island February 13, 1988
Iowa February 13, 1988 South Carolina October 6, 2002
Kansas February 13, 1988 South Dakota November 15, 1990
Kentucky January 10, 1991 Tennessee April 21, 2004
Louisiana March 5, 1995 Texas January 31, 2010
Maine July 30, 2004 US Virgin Islands November 14, 2010
Maryland January 31, 2010 Vermont July 1, 2003
Massachusetts January 31, 2010 Virginia January 31, 2010
Michigan January 31, 2010 Washington January 31, 2010
Minnesota August 14, 1990 West Virginia February 13, 1988
Missouri February 13, 1988 Wisconsin August 10, 1989
Montana November 9, 1989 Wyoming August 24, 2014
Nebraska July 21, 1994
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Table 3.3: Robustness Check: Daily Average Temperature
(1) (2)
VARIABLES log(PB/trip) log(PB/trip)
log(Jackpot) 0.427*** 0.427***
(0.00442) (0.00452)
Average Temperature 0.00109*** 0.00133***
(0.000123) (0.000169)
Observations 843,097 843,028
R-squared 0.715 0.532
Within R-squared 0.16 0.075
County FEs YES YES
Year by State FEs YES YES
Month by State YES YES
DOW FFs YES YES
Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Robustness Check: Different Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(PB/trip) log(PB/spent) log(PB/trip) log(PB/spent)
log(Jackpot) 0.434*** 0.441*** 0.434*** 0.441***
(0.00434) (0.00442) (0.00428) (0.00435)
Maximum Temperature 0.00109*** 0.00154*** 0.00112*** 0.00154***
(9.78e-05) (0.000131) (0.000103) (0.000122)
Observations 843,097 843,028 843,097 843,028
R-squared 0.713 0.530 0.713 0.529
Within R-squared 0.172 0.084 0.172 0.084
County FEs YES YES YES YES
Year by State FEs YES YES YES YES
Season by State YES YES NO NO
DOW FFs YES YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.6: Robustness Check: Retail Stores Selling Powerball
Table 3.5: Robustness Check: Retail Stores Selling Powerball
(1) (2)
VARIABLES log(PB/trip) log(PB/spent)
log(Jackpot) 0.433*** 0.433***
(0.00469) (0.00466)
Maximum Temperature 0.00116*** 0.00140***
(0.000118) (0.000173)
Observations 693,995 693,816
R-squared 0.776 0.557
Within R-squared 0.202 0.08
County FEs YES YES
Year by State FEs YES YES
Month by State YES YES
DOW FFs YES YES
Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Robustness Check: Lag of Jackpot Size and Temperature
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(PB/spent) log(PB/spent) log(PB/spent)
log(Jackpot) 0.370*** 0.427*** 0.370***
(0.00418) (0.00453) (0.00418)
log(Jackpot−1) 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.00208) (0.00208)
Maximum Temperature 0.000894*** 0.000647*** 0.000590***
(0.000150) (0.000177) (0.000177)
MaximumTemperature−1 0.000543*** 0.000418**
(0.000195) (0.000196)
Observations 838,230 842,150 837,905
R-squared 0.533 0.531 0.532
Within R-squared 0.078 0.075 0.078
County FEs YES YES YES
Year by State FEs YES YES YES
Month by State YES YES YES
DOW FFs YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 3.7: Robustness Check: Cookie Sales
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Table 3.7: Robustness Check: Sales of Other Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log(Cookie/Spent) log(Coffee/spent) log(Soap/spent) log(Cereal/spent) log(Tobacco/spent)
log(Jackpot) -0.00268 0.000372 0.00460 0.00867*** 0.00395
(0.00208) (0.00261) (0.00314) (0.00197) (0.00393)
Maximum Temperature -7.63e-05 -0.000389* -0.000139 -3.15e-05 0.000790**
(0.000207) (0.000226) (0.000264) (0.000162) (0.000344)
Observations 314,811 250,562 194,255 357,592 179,559
R-squared 0.372 0.395 0.412 0.329 0.423
Within R-squared 0 0 0 0 0
County FEs YES YES YES YES YES
Year by State FEs YES YES YES YES YES
Month by State YES YES YES YES YES
DOW FFs YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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